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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a website used by hundreds of millions of people worldwide. 
The site offers-free of charge-a new, innovative social networking ser-
vice that people compulsively check several times a day. Now imagine that, 
in order to entice such a large following, the website hid or misstated the 
nature of the service offered. For instance, imagine that its advertisements 
claimed that it would never sell user data to advertisers-but, later realizing 
the fmancial potential there, the service began to do so, and reaped large 
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Office and Lecturer at the University of California at Berkeley Law School; J.D. 2003, Har-
vard. The opinions in this Article are hers alone and should not be ascribed to the San Fran-
cisco City Attorney's Office. Theresa Lee was the 2011-2012 Associate Research Scholar in 
Law, San Francisco Affirmative Litigation Project Fellow, and Lecturer in Law at Yale Law 
School; J.D. 2011, Yale. We would especially like to thank Heather Gerken, Tamara Piety, 
Jack Balkin, Robert Post, and Anjali Dalal for their extraordinarily helpful comments and 
critiques. Thank you also to Jonathan Meltzer for his excellent research assistance. All mis-
takes are, of course, our own. 
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profits. Now, imagine that the advertisements that drew in the hundreds of 
millions of users whose data formed the profit backbone of the company 
were entirely unregulable by government agencies or private lawsuits. 
Though this scenario may seem far-fetched, it is a rising possibility. 
The commercial speech doctrine, tangled though it may be, has been limited 
in scope to speech that proposes a commercial transaction. But outdated 
notions of what constitutes a "commercial transaction" threaten to leave the 
advertisements and other representations to users of services like Facebook, 
Google, Twitter, Bing, and Pinterest entirely unregulable. While thus far, 
many of these service providers have been willing to submit to the regulato-
ry authority of the Federal Trade Commission, for example, their use of the 
First Amendment as a defense in consumer suits has begun to proliferate.' 
While the actions taken by these companies have not yet implicated the 
regulatory authority of the government related to advertising, terms of ser-
vice, or data collection, the dawning recognition of the utility of the First 
Amendment to these companies underscores the importance of shaping the 
doctrine to reach modem technologies and business models. 
In recent years, the dominant model of fee-for-service or fee-for-goods 
commercial transactions has shifted. In the past decade, a crop of technolog-
ical services and social media has used a new modei,2 or rather, has re-
invigorated an old one.3 Companies like Facebook, Google, and Twitter 
offer services used by billions of users that have become central to our day-
to-day lives. 4 These services are free to users. 5 But, as many shrewd com-
1. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for More Definite Statement or 
Dismissal at 15-18, E.K.D. ex rei. Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 894 (S.D. Ill. 
2012) (No. 3:11-461-GPM), http://www.scribd.com/doc/76515447/EKD-et-al-v-Facebook-
Motion-to-Dismiss-IIIinois. Google also recently commissioned scholars Eugene Volokh and 
Donald Falk to write a paper advancing the argument that Google results are fully protected 
speech. EUGENE VOLOKH & DONALD M. FALK, FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR SEARCH 
ENGINE SEARCH RESULTS (2012), available at http://www.volokh.com/wp-
content/uploads/20 12/05/SearchEngineFirstAmendment. pdf. 
2. The App Economy, NPR PLANET MONEY (Jan. 31, 2012) (downloaded using 
iTunes). 
3. Current social media and technological services offer their products free to users 
much like television programming in the days prior to cable television. 
4. Key Facts, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2013) (reporting one billion Facebook users as of October 2012); Lucy Hodg-
son, Twitter 2012 [lnfographic}, BLOG HERALD (Feb. 22, 2012, 9:40 AM), 
http:/ /www.blogherald.com/20 12/02/22/twitter-20 12-infographic/ (reporting 465 million 
Twitter users as of2012); Harrison Weber, Gmail Closes in on Hotmail with 350 MM Active 
Users, NEXT WEB (Jan. 19, 2012), http://thenextweb.com/google/2012/01119/gmail-closes-
in-on-hotmail-with-350-mm-active-users/ (reporting Gmail, Google's web based mail sys-
tem, has 350 million active users and Google Plus has 90 million users); Dan Farber, Google 
Search Scratches Its Brain 500 Million Times a Day, CNET (May 13, 2013, 6:16PM) (re-
porting that Google processes 100 billion searches per day). 
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mentators have noted, when users don't pay for a product, often the user is 
the product.6 That is, companies like Google and Facebook develop a large 
user base by offering free services and then "sell against" that user base to 
advertisers, venture capitalists, and other financial backers. 7 
The central focus of this Article is the interplay between traditional 
commercial speech analysis, which focuses on whether a fee is exchanged 
for goods or services, and the rise of new non-linear commercial transac-
tions. Current commercial speech doctrine takes a relatively limited view as 
to what constitutes a commercial transaction. 8 Though providing an only 
slightly more expansive understanding on occasion,9 the Court has identi-
fied commercial speech as that speech that "does 'no more than propose a 
commercial transaction. "' 10 This vision of what constitutes commercial 
5. See, e.g., FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (stat-
ing, "It's free and always will be"); Twitter Terms of Service, TWITIER, 
https://twitter.com/tos (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (indicating that upon sign up, the terms of 
use are meant to be the "entire and exclusive agreement between Twitter" and the user and 
contain no financial charges to the user). 
6. Indeed, Google's F AQ for investors answers the question "[ w ]ho are our cus-
tomers?" as follows: "Our customers are over one million of advertisers, from small busi-
nesses targeting local customers to many of the world's largest global enterprises, who use 
Google AdWords to reach millions of users around the world." Investor Relations, GOOGLE, 
http://investor.google.com/corporate/faq.html#toc-customers (last visited Apr. 8, 2013); see 
also Brendan Greeley, The Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights: Are We the Consumers, or Are 
We the Product?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://www. businessweek.com/articles/20 12-02-23/the-consumer-privacy-bill-of-rights-are-
we-the-consumers-or-are-we-the-product; Freee Bacon!, SEAPEGASUS BLOG (Sept. 27, 2011 ), 
http://seapegasus.org/?p=290 (depicting a cartoon of two pigs saying, "Isn't it great? We 
have to pay nothing for the bam" and "Yeah! And even the food is free" followed by com-
mentary: "Facebook and You: If you're not paying for it, you're not the customer. You're the 
product being sold."); The "Free" Model, GEEK & POKE (Dec. 21, 2010, 12:19 AM), 
http:/ I geekandpoke.typepad.com/ geekandpoke/20 I 0/ 12/the-free-model.html (showing a 
cartoon without Facebook-specific commentary). 
7. See, e.g., Michael Brush, A Field Guide to the Facebook !PO, MSN MONEY 
(Feb. 7, 2012, 6:54 PM), http://money.msn.com/investment-advice/a-field-guide-to-the-
facebook-ipo-brush.aspx?page=O (noting "Facebook has a wider range of much more target-
ed personal information to sell against"); Benjamin Pimentel, How Facebook Makes Money 
Could Change, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2012, 5:59PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-C0-
20 120202-720732.html (explaining that 85% of current revenue stream of Face book is, like 
the majority of Google's revenue, supported by selling advertising to be viewed by Face-
book's users). 
8. See infra Section I.A. 
9. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 62, 66-67 (1983) (finding that 
a pamphlet that merely identified a manufacturer was commercial speech); Cent. Hudson 
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980) (identifying speech 
as commercial if it "relate[s] solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audi-
ence"). 
10. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). In the more recent United States v. United Foods, Inc., the Court 
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speech leaves out much of the speech, even economically motivated speech, 
of corporations and producers. 11 
An inflexible application of a direct profit-focused commercial speech 
test might place companies like Google and Facebook outside the purview 
of local, state, or federal laws that seek to regulate their interactions with 
users. 12 Current willingness to submit to regulation does not ensure that 
future attempts at regulation will not be met by First Amendment challeng-
es, especially as these companies appear to only have recently begun think-
ing about the First Amendment status of their speech and products. 13 While 
there may be reasons to be cautious about placing more and more speech 
within the ambit of commercial speech rather than fully protected speech, 14 
it is equally perilous to afford truly commercial speech the full protections 
afforded to non-commercial speech under the First Amendment. 15 The dan-
gers of commercial speech, the interests in ensuring consumers have all 
pointed out that over the course of the history of the commercial speech doctrine, commer-
cial speech is "usually defined as speech that does no more than propose a commercial trans-
action." 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001). See also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 
2674-75 (2011). But see Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62. 
11. Cf Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247-48, 262 (Cal. 2002) (holding that 
statements about labor policies, practices, and conditions where athletic shoes and apparel 
were made were commercial speech). Kasky caused a great deal of uproar in the commercial 
speech context, and while the Supreme Court initially granted certiorari, it was later dis-
missed as improvidently granted. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003) (per 
curiam). In a concurrence, Justice Stevens stressed the novelty of the First Amendment ques-
tions presented, indicating it was not time for the court to review the status of the "blending 
of commercial speech, noncommercial speech and debate on an issue of public importance." 
!d. at 663 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
12. This Article focuses only on the communications between websites that form the 
initial relationship----that is, advertisements and the website's Terms of Service and posted 
privacy policies. This Article does not intend to address the use of personal data by various 
online actors after a relationship is formed with a user. Numerous scholars have dealt ably 
with the First Amendment issues attendant to data privacy. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Rec-
onciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REv. 1149 (2005); Eugene 
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right 
to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1049 (2000). 
13. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; infra notes 182-84 and accompanying 
text. 
14. Authors have warned against the danger of an expanded definition of commer-
cial speech. See, e.g., Bruce E.H. Johnson & Arnbika K. Doran, Amendment XXVIII? De-
fending Corporate Speech Rights, 58 S.C. L. REv. 855, 857 (2007); Elliott L. Dozier, Note, 
Kasky v. Nike: The Effect of the Commercial Speech Classification on Corporate State-
ments, 33 STETSON L. REv. 1035, 1038 (2004). 
15. See generally TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 
COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (2012) (examining the dangers of treating commercial 
speech as fully protected speech); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate 
Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995 (1998) (arguing against treating corporate speech 
as fully protected). 
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necessary information, 16 and the interests in making sure that corporate 
players (even those offering free services) are on a level playing field with 
their competitors make defining the scope of the commercial speech doc-
trine a critical task. 17 
If only speech that proposes a direct fee-for-service transaction be-
tween a product's creator and the product's user is considered commercial 
speech, much of the current regulation of companies like Google and Face-
book would be subject to the more stringent limitations of non-commercial 
speech regulation. 18 The ramifications of such an outcome are troubling. 19 
Over the past several years, there has been a rising tide of unease re-
garding the potential use (or misuse) of user information by Face book, 
Google, and other free service Internet companies. 2° Consumers, legal 
scholars, and privacy advocates have demanded more restrictive policies on 
the use of such information21 and more stringent government regulation of 
breaches of privacy policies. 22 Underlying these calls for action is an as-
16. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 763-64 (1976). In establishing the commercial speech doctrine, the main concern of the 
Court was not simply, nor even primarily, for the speaker proposing the commercial transac-
tion. See id. Rather, the Court was clearly stressing the interest of both the particular con-
sumer and society as a whole in the free flow of commercial information. See id. 
17. See James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment 
Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091 (2004) (considering 
the difficulty and importance of categorizing speech); Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, 
What Is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. REs. L. 
REv. 1143, 1147-50 (2004) (considering the line between commercial and non-commercial 
speech). 
18. See infra Sections II.B-C. 
19. See infra Sections II.B-C. 
20. Daniel Ionescu, Facebook Privacy Fail: Apps Leak Private Info, Report, 
PCWORLD (Oct. 18, 2010, 6:18 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/208058/ face-
book_privacy_fail_apps_leak_private_info_report.html; Google Privacy Changes 'In Breach 
of EU Law,' BBC NEWS (Mar. 1, 2012, I 0:00AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
17205754. 
21. See David Sarno, 'Do Not Track Me Online' Privacy Bill Introduced by Califor-
nia Rep. Jackie Speier, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2011, 10:18 AM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/02/do-not-track-me-online-privacy-
legislation-introduced-by-calif-congresswoman.html; THE WHITE HousE, CONSUMER DATA 
PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND 
PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY (2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf; Benny Evangelista, Search 
Engine Users Worry About Privacy Invasion, SFGATE (Mar. 9, 2012, 12:40 PM), 
http:/lblog.sfgate.com/techchron/2012/03/09/search-engine-users-worry-about-privacy-
invasion/. 
22. See Jon Brodkin, Consumer Groups Hammer Facebook Privacy Violations in 
Federal Complaint, PCWORLD (May 6, 2010, 6:10 PM), 
http://www.pcworld.corn!article/195818/Facebook.html; Molly Jennings, To Track or Not To 
Track: Recent Legislative Proposals to Protect Consumer Privacy, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
193 (2012); FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
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sumption that the government can require companies that provide free ser-
vices to publish privacy policies-and that the government can punish com-
panies for breaching their stated policies. 
Let us imagine, for example, that Facebook were to publish to its users 
a policy with regards to its use of private user information. 23 Furthermore, 
imagine that Facebook's website promoted its strict privacy policy on the 
sign up page for new users. 24 Should local, state, or federal regulators be 
able to enforce this policy? Should they even be able to compel that such a 
policy be posted or formulated? Thus far, not only commentators but also 
regulators25-and even, to an extent, Facebook itself26- have answered this 
question in the affirmative. 
Likewise, imagine that Google aggressively promoted its Google+ 
product through television advertisements that contained false and mislead-
ing statements about the capabilities of Google+. Would such advertise-
ments be subject to regulation by state or local prohibitions on false and 
misleading advertising? Although one's instinct might be to answer in the 
affirmative, because consumers pay nothing for the Google+ service, 27 cur-
rent First Amendment doctrine might suggest that the less stringent stand-
ards applicable to the regulation of commercial speech would not be a good 
fit. 
Given that both the regulators and, to an extent, the regulated compa-
nies believe that their speech directed at non-paying users is able to be regu-
lated without meeting the exacting First Amendment standards afforded to 
non-commercial speech, perhaps the error is not that the assumption is 
wrong, but rather that the current contours of the commercial speech doc-
trine have become outdated. 
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/20 I 0/12/101201 privacyreport.pdf 
23. It does. Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/ 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2013). 
24. /d. (showing that the Facebook "Data Use Policy," which explains the privacy 
policy, is provided via hyperlink directly below the sign-up for a Facebook account: "By 
clicking Sign Up, you agree to our Terms and that you have read our Data Use Policy .... "). 
25. Complaint, Facebook, Inc., No. 092-3184 (Fed. Trade Comm'n 2012) (No. C-
4365), 2012 WL 3518628, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/111129facebookcmpt.pdf [hereinafter Complaint, 
Facebook, Inc.]. 
26. Somini Sengupta, F.T.C. Settles Privacy Issue at Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
30,2011, at Bl (submitting to regulation of the F.T.C. via settlement). 
27. See Google Terms of Service, GooGLE, 
https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (last visited Apr. 8, 20 13) (indicating that its 
Terms of Service include no charges); Create a New Google Account, GoOGLE, 
https://accounts.google.com/SignUp?service=oz&continue=https://plus.google.com/?gpcaz"/o 
3D8c39f574&hl=en-US (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (requiring users to create a free Google 
Account to sign up for Google+). 
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This Article addresses the tension between the current commercial 
speech test and the rise of business models in which companies do not 
charge users directly for their products, and proposes two alternate commer-
cial speech tests as solutions to this problem. In Part I, the Article discusses 
the current test for commercial speech and its implied reliance on a direct 
economic transaction between the consumer and the speaker/company. In 
Part II, the Article examines the rise of business models that do not rely on a 
fee-for-service transaction and the complexities of applying the current 
commercial speech test to those businesses. In Part III, the Article explores 
two alternate commercial speech tests--one from the consumer perspec-
tive28 and the other from the business perspective29-that will allow the doc-
trine to adjust to the advent of new business models. Although the consum-
er-oriented model of determining whether speech is commercial may per-
haps solve the "problem" of new business models, a business-focused test 
that examines whether an entity was "selling against" its users in determin-
ing whether speech is commercial has not to date been proposed. We pro-
pose a fresh definition of "commercial transaction" that takes into account 
the Internet economy and other indirect financial exchanges. By including 
transactions where a company leverages consumer participation as a salea-
ble good, the commercial speech doctrine can remain effective and vital in 
today's digital age. 
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE CONSUMER 
A. The Development of the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
Like the Internet, 30 the commercial speech test is a creature of relative-
ly recent pedigree. Though the Supreme Court has addressed this doctrine 
relatively frequently over the past few decades, it seems clear from the 
Court's body of commercial speech jurisprudence that its concept of what 
constitutes a commercial transaction is based on an overly simple-and 
perhaps outdated-notion of commerce. Just as some have noted the 
Court's slowness to adapt constitutional doctrine to new technology in the 
28. See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. 
REv. 1, 55-57 (2000) (recognizing the listener's interest as substantial in the commercial 
context). 
29. See Greeley, supra note 6 (explaining that when individuals use free online 
services, they are supplying the providers with information that is then sold "to the compa-
nies of the Digital Advertising Alliance," the actual customers). 
30. Although there is some controversy about when the Internet was created, the 
term "Internet" may have first been used in 1974 by Vinton Cerf and Robert Kahn in a paper 
on Transmission Control Protocol. GARY P. SCHNEIDER & JESSICA EVANS, THE INTERNET app. 
at 13 (7th ed. 2009). 
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Fourth Amendment context, 31 it seems that the commercial speech doctrine 
has not necessarily taken the web economy into account, despite coming of 
age with the Internet. 
Protection under the commercial speech doctrine first arose just thirty-
seven years ago in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc. 32 At the time, past decisions of the Court had sug-
gested that commercial speech was unprotected, 33 and this was the first time 
the issue of"whether there is a First Amendment exception for 'commercial 
speech"' was "squarely before" the Court.34 It was in this first venture of 
offering commercial speech First Amendment protection that the Court con-
strained its vision of what constitutes commercial speech for all subsequent 
cases. Framing the question before it as "whether speech which does 'no 
more than propose a commercial transaction' ... lacks all protection,"35 the 
Court, perhaps unintentionally, offered up this vision as the defmition of 
what constitutes commercial speech. 
As the commercial speech doctrine continued to develop, it became 
apparent that the framing question of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy had 
constrained the understanding of what constitutes commercial speech. Echo-
ing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products 
Corp. identifies the "core notion of commercial speech [as] 'speech which 
31. JAY STANLEY, THE CRISIS IN FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 1 (2010), 
available at http:/ /www.acslaw.org/files/ ACS%20Issue%20Brief"lo20-
%20Stanley%204th%20Amendment.pdf (noting that "courts are particularly slow in adapt-
ing our traditions to new technologies ... [such that] [i]t took almost 40 years for the Su-
preme Court to recognize that the Constitution should apply to the wiretapping of telephone 
conversations"); see also Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Cate-
gories, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1762 (2007) (noting generally that "legal doctrine, typically 
in the service of the frequently desirable values of stability and predictability, is itself often 
slow to adapt to changes in the external world"). 
32. 425 u.s. 748 (1976). 
33. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (upholding a conviction for a 
violation of ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions); Val-
entine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (finding that the First Amendment prevented 
the government from banning all communication by handbill but imposed "no such restraint 
on government [with) respect[ to] purely commercial advertising"). 
34. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760-61. In the previous term, the Court 
had determined in Bigelow v. Virginia that a conviction under a Virginia statute for advertis-
ing the availability of abortions in New York could not stand. 421 U.S. 809, 811-12, 829 
(1975). Notably, in that case the Court did not determine the status of commercial speech, 
but noted that the advertisement at issue "did more than simply propose a commercial trans-
action. It contained factual material of clear 'public interest."' /d. at 822. It is interesting to 
consider whether and why the Court determined the advertising of abortions was a matter in 
the public interest but determined the advertising of another medical service, distribution of 
prescription drugs, was simply a question of commercial interest. See id. at 811-12, 829; Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 750, 760-61. 
35. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). 
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does no more than propose a commercial transaction. "'36 Bolger, oft cited 
for what falls into the commercial speech category versus fully protected 
speech, 37 notably considers "informational pamphlets" that could not "be 
categorized merely as proposals to engage in commercial transactions. "38 
Bolger is otherwise a rather unremarkable commercial speech case. Though 
not uniformly thought of in this way, Bolger should perhaps be considered 
most notable not for its recitation of the "'no more than propose'" defini-
tion, but for its determination that speech that speech not directly proposing 
a commercial transaction should be analyzed under the commercial speech 
doctrine. 39 It is conceivable that little attention was paid to this distinction 
because the statute in question was found unconstitutional even under the 
less exacting commercial speech standard.40 It is worthwhile to note, how-
ever, that at some point in the development of the commercial speech doc-
trine, the Court was willing to assess speech that did not directly propose a 
commercial transaction under the commercial speech test based on the sur-
rounding circumstances. 41 The Court identified three characteristics applica-
ble to determining that these informational pamphlets constituted commer-
cial speech, noting that it was "[t]he combination" of the characteristics that 
supported the conclusion. 42 These were (l) the concession that the pam-
phlets were advertisements; (2) the reference to a specific product; and (3) 
that there was an economic motivation in mailing the pamphlets.43 The 
Court noted that none of these reasons would alone be sufficient to turn the 
mailings into commercial speech, but that taken together they "provide[d] 
36. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,66 (1983) (quoting Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762). 
37. Many cases cite to Bolger for a definition of commercial speech as doing '"no 
more than propos[ing] a commercial transaction."' See. e.g., Wag More Dogs, L.L.C. v. 
Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 369 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66); Hilton v. HalJmark 
Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 905 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 
255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bolger, 453 U.S. at 66)); City of Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,422 (1993) (quoting Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66); S.O.C., 
Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir.), amended by 160 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 
1998) (quoting Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66). 
38. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66. 
39. !d. (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762); !d. at 66 n.13, 67-68. 
One of the pamphlets in question repeatedly discussed condoms, but without reference to the 
manufacturer's brands. !d. at 66 n.13. "The only reference to appellee's products is contained 
at the very bottom of the last page, where appellee is ·identified as the distributor of Trojan-
brand prophylactics." !d.; see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002) (using Bol-
ger in just this way). 
40. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66, 75. 
41. See id. at 66. 
42. !d. at 67. 
43. !d. at 66-67. 
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strong support for the . . . conclusion that the informational pamphlets are 
properly characterized as commercial speech."44 
The threshold question of what actually constitutes commercial speech 
is critical, especially because the treatment of speech once this first hurdle is 
passed is so different from the treatment of speech that is fully protected 
under the First Amendment. Determining what speech falls into and out of 
commercial speech's purview-and for the speech that is not commercial, 
whether that speech is instead entitled to full First Amendment protection or 
is outside the protection of the Amendment entirely-is virtually the entire 
ball game when it comes to upholding government speech regulations in 
this area. 45 
The test that is applied once the speech in question is determined to be 
commercial was set out in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission of New York. 46 In examining a ban on advertising by a 
utility company, the Court outlined the parameters for testing the validity of 
regulations on commercial speech.47 Central Hudson spawned a four-part 
test that now bears its name in commercial speech litigation and case law: 
(1) the speech must be "protected by the First Amendment," that is, "it at 
least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading"; and (2) the court 
will assess "whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial."48 
Upon answering both of these questions in the affirmative, the court looks 
to (3) "whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted," and ( 4) "whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to 
serve that interest."49 In establishing this test, the Court remained conscious 
that one of the important interests underlying the protection of commercial 
speech at all is to "assist[] consumers and further[] the societal interest in 
the fullest possible dissemination of information."50 Even in considering 
advertising that "communicates only an incomplete version of the relevant 
facts," the Court still was thinking in terms of government prohibitions on 
44. /d. at 67. 
45. In litigation, governments sometimes must all but concede that the regulation in 
question would not survive a review under strict scrutiny and instead focus their entire litiga-
tion strategy on fighting to keep the speech in question within the category of commercial 
speech. See, e.g., Brief of Defendants-Appellees, Dex Media West, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 
696 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 11-35787, 11-35399), 2011 WL 6980707 (spending the 
bulk of the brief arguing that Yellow Pages were in fact commercial speech). Empirical 
analysis demonstrates that although the "famous adage ['strict in theory, fatal in fact'] arose 
in the context of equal protection, strict scrutiny is actually most fatal in the area of free 
speech." Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 807, 844 (2006). 
46. 447 u.s. 557 (I 980). 
47. /d. at 566. 
48. /d. 
49. /d. 
50. /d. at 561-62. 
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speech, noting, "the First Amendment presumes that some accurate infor-
mation is better than no information at all."51 
The deep difference in the treatment of commercial versus non-
commercial speech can be aptly illustrated by the first step of the Central 
Hudson test. The first prong requires that the speech "must concern lawful 
activity and not be misleading."52 If the speech, already defmed as commer-
cial through the definitional test considered in Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy and Bolger, does not meet these two elements of the first prong 
of the Central Hudson test, it no longer has recourse to any of the protec-
tions of the First Amendment. 53 This status is striking in its difference from 
the treatment of non-commercial speech, where the truth-value of the 
speech does not determine the level of protection afforded to the speech. 54 
In the recent case, United States v. Alvarez, where the Court held that a fed-
eral statute criminalizing false speech related to claims of military service 
was unconstitutional under the First Amendment as a content-based re-
striction, the Court pointed to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy for the 
proposition that fraudulent speech falls outside of the protection of the First 
Amendment. 55 The Court's citation to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 
however, served to underscore the different understanding the Court has, at 
this point, for commercial versus non-commercial speech. 56 The language of 
the decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy seemed more expansive 
(dismissing the idea of protecting false speech in general) than what it was 
cited for or what was eventually held in Alvarez. 57 The holding in Alvarez, 
51. !d. at 562 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350,374 (1977)). 
52. !d. at 566. 
53. /d. at 561, 566; Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983). 
54. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546-47 (2012) (indicating the deci-
sion "rejects the notion that false speech should be in a general category that is presumptive-
ly unprotected"); see also id. at 2542, 2547-48 (holding that a statute criminalizing false 
speech related to claims of military service "would endorse government authority to compile 
a list of subjects about which false statements are punishable. That governmental power has 
no clear limiting principle .... Were this law to be sustained, there could be an endless list of 
subjects the National Government or the States could single out. ... Were the Court to hold 
that the interest in truthful discourse alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent any 
evidence that the speech was used to gain a material advantage, it would give government a 
broad censorial power unprecedented in this Court's cases or in our constitutional tradition. 
The mere potential for the exercise of that power casts a chill, a chill the First Amendment 
cannot permit if free speech, thought, and discourse are to remain a foundation of our free-
dom"). 
55. !d. at 2542-43,2545,2547. 
56. See id. at 2547 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). 
57. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 ("Untruthful speech, commercial or 
otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake."); Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2547 (stressing 
that Virginia State Board of Pharmacy notes that "fraudulent" speech is unprotected by the 
First Amendment). 
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especially when juxtaposed against the first prong of the Central Hudson 
test, underscores the difference between commercial and non-commercial 
speech, and thus, the importance of capturing the speech in which there is 
the strongest interest in regulating when constructing the defmition of 
commercial speech. 
The importance of capturing all of the speech that we would want to 
be regulated as commercial speech was made even more salient by the 
Court's further clarification of the Central Hudson test. The fourth prong, 
which demands that the regulation be no "more extensive than is necessary 
to serve [the asserted government] interest,"58 was sometimes read through-
out the ensuing decade as being equivalent to demanding the regulation be 
the "least restrictive measure."59 This understanding of the fourth prong 
would amount to commercial speech having comparable or even greater 
protection than non-commercial speech in some situations. Realizing this 
discontinuity, the Court rejected the interpretation of the fourth prong as 
requiring the regulation be the least restrictive approach. 60 Acknowledging 
that its own previous dicta assumed the fourth step of Central Hudson was 
synonymous with "the 'least-restrictive-means' approach,"61 the Court ex-
pressly addressed the question and determined that the test "requires some-
thing short of a least-restrictive-means standard."62 Noting that they had not 
even required this standard in cases "where core political speech is at is-
sue,"63 the Court set the standard at "a means narrowly tailored to achieve 
the desired objective. Within those bounds we leave it to governmental 
decisionrnakers to judge what manner of regulation may best be em-
ployed."64 Thus, the refinement of the fourth prong of the Central Hudson 
test creates a real difference between whether protection for commercial or 
non-commercial speech is applied-and makes identifying the correct 
threshold markers all the more important. 
58. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
59. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476 (1989) 
("We have indeed assumed in dicta the validity of the 'least-restrictive-means' approach."); 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 n.l4 (I 985) (noting that while 
the Court used the "least restrictive means" test in assessing commercial speech, a different 
test is needed for disclosure regulations); Fox v. Bd. ofTrs. of State Univ. ofN.Y., 841 F.2d 
1207, 1214 (2d Cir. 1988); Sambo's Rests., Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 693 
(6th Cir. 1981 ). 
60. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480. There still seems to be some confusion among the courts 
as to whether the least restrictive approach test plays a part in evaluating the regulation of 
commercial speech. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 167 (2d Cir. 2012) (vacating 
a criminal conviction for off-label drug marketing, noting that "[n]umerous, less speech-
restrictive alternatives are available, as are non-criminal penalties"). 
61. Fox, 492 U.S. at 476. 
62. !d. at 477. 
63. !d. 
64. !d. at 480. 
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While for a period the posited intermediate scrutiny appeared much 
more like rational basis review,65 as the decades have progressed, commer-
cial speech has found substantial protection from the courts. 66 Most notably, 
the Court's most recent commercial speech case appeared to muddle the 
accepted understanding of commercial speech and application of the Cen-
tral Hudson test, thus causing consternation among regulators and academ-
ics, and even in half of the Court. 67 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. dealt with a challenge by data miners and 
pharmaceutical manufacturers against Vermont's Prescription Confidentiali-
ty Law, which placed restrictions upon the sale, disclosure, and use of 
pharmacy records that displayed the prescribing practices of physicians 
within the State. 68 At issue in IMS Health was the pharmaceutical marketing 
practice known as "detailing," whereby pharmacies, who receive "prescrib-
er-identifying information" when processing prescriptions, sell that infor-
mation to data-miners, who then produce reports on doctors' prescribing 
65. See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Unit-
ed States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993). In Posadas, the Court upheld a regulation 
that prohibited advertising by casinos to Puerto Rican residents. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 348. In 
Edge Broadcasting, building on its decision in Fox, in assessing a ban on lottery advertising 
by broadcasters in states where the lottery is illegal, the Court "concluded that the validity of 
restrictions on commercial speech should not be judged by standards more stringent than 
those applied to expressive conduct entitled to full First Amendment protection or to relevant 
time, place, or manner restrictions." Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 428-29. Rather, "commer-
cial speech cases require a fit between the restriction and the government interest that is not 
necessarily perfect, but reasonable." /d. This pair of cases perhaps muddled the Central 
Hudson test more than clarified it. As the dissent in Posadas noted, prior to that case, the 
Court had "consistently invalidated restrictions designed to deprive consumers of accurate 
information about products and services legally offered for sale." Posadas, 478 U.S. at 350 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). And in Edge Broadcasting, the regulated radio station at issue 
actually reached more people in the state where the lottery was legal rather than in its licens-
ing state. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 429. The outcome in Edge Broadcasting left some 
wondering about the extent of the fit required between the government interest and the re-
striction. Perhaps Posadas and Edge Broadcasting can be dismissed as only applying in the 
case of gambling, a long recognized social ill. However, neither case holds up the subject 
matter as the primary motivation underlying the decision, nor do the cases claim to set out a 
different test in the gambling context. These cases marked, perhaps, the low point of protec-
tion for commercial speech, but the Court returned to greater protections just three years after 
Edge Broadcasting. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
66. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 489 (holding that a ban on price advertising of 
alcohol was unconstitutional under the First Amendment). 
67. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2677 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
("Thus, it is not surprising that, until today, this Court has never found that the First Amend-
ment prohibits the government from restricting the use of information gathered pursuant to a 
regulatory mandate-whether the information rests in government files or has remained in 
the hands of the private firms that gathered it. ... Nor has this Court ever previously applied 
any form of 'heightened' scrutiny in any even roughly similar case."). 
68. See id. at 2659 (majority opinion). 
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behavior and sell that information to pharmaceutical manufacturers. 69 The 
law at issue mandated that this prescriber information "may not be sold, 
disclosed by pharmacies for marketing purposes, or used for marketing by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers."70 The majority and dissenting opinions had 
entirely different views of the speech in question, and the outcome of the 
case left many questioning the continued viability of the commercial speech 
doctrine. 71 The majority held, "Speech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing[] 
is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment" and is thus subject to heightened scrutiny.72 Even though the 
law in question only regulated information for use in commercial transac-
tions, the Court determined that the state law amounted to both content-
based and speaker-based restrictions. 73 It is clear that from the Court's focus 
on the content-based nature of the Vermont law that commercial speech 
analysis was not considered as the appropriate mode of analysis, if consid-
ered at all. 74 In what was perhaps most shocking to commentators, the ma-
jority opinion contains only one reference to Central Hudson, rather than a 
clear analysis of the statute in question under the four-prong test. 75 
The dissent in IMS Health took an entirely different view of the statute 
before it. Simply put, for the dissent, the only 
effect on expression is inextricably related to a lawful governmental effort to regu-
late a commercial enterprise. The First Amendment does not require courts to ap-
ply a special "heightened" standard of review when reviewing such an effort. And, 
in any event, the statute meets the First Amendment standard this Court has previ-
ously applied when the government seeks to regulate commercial speech. 76 
These two visions of the speech in question in IMS Health are entirely 
divergent and thus leave many commentators scratching their heads at what 
69. !d. at 2659-60. 
70. !d. at 2659. 
71. See Kevin Outterson, Higher First Amendment Hurdles for Public Health Regu-
lation, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. e13 (2011), available at 
http:/ /www.nejm.org/doi/fulV1 0.1 056/NEJMp 1107614 ?viewType=Print. But see Micah 
Berman, Kathleen Dachille & Julie Ralston Aoki, Sorrell and the Future of Commercial 
Speech Regulations, JURIST (Oct. 4, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011110/berman-dachille-
aoki-sorrell.php (asserting that "Sorrell did not break any new legal ground"). 
72. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2659. 
73. !d. at 2663. All commercial speech analyses are necessarily content based, as 
they rest on a determination of whether the speech's content proposes a commercial transac-
tion. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the 
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 396 ("arguing that 'obscenity, commercial speech, 
and 'fighting words" must be outside the category of "speech" if content neutrality is man-
datory."). 
74. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2663-64. 
75. !d. at 2668. 
76. !d. at 2673 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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constitutes commercial speech. 77 Despite the apparent new "content" analy-
sis of IMS Health, the case underscores the importance of the definitional 
question of what constitutes commercial speech. 78 The data exchange in 
question appeared to be wholly commercial-the very stuff of a commercial 
transaction. 79 For the majority of the Court, however, as their content-based 
analysis highlights, the statute was not regulating commercial speech, that 
is, speech that "does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction. "'80 
In addition to having a clear understanding of the legal doctrine that 
applies to commercial speech, it is important to also keep an eye on the val-
ues the Court was aiming to protect when setting up this relatively new doc-
trine. In establishing that commercial speech was not devoid of protection 
under the First Amendment, the Court looked to the interest of both the 
speaker and the listener, determining that a "particular consumer's interest 
in the free flow of commercial information ... may be as keen, if not keener 
by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate."81 The 
Court generalized this interest to be one of society at large and notes that in 
maintaining "a predominantly free enterprise economy, ... the free flow of 
commercial information is indispensable."82 In establishing that commercial 
speech was not devoid of First Amendment protection, the Court was care-
ful to note that this did not mean that no regulation of commercial speech 
could stand, rather "[ w ]hat [was] at issue [was] whether a State may com-
pletely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about 
entirely lawful activity."83 It is notable that the first foray of commercial 
speech into the constitutional realm dealt with attempts by the government 
to prevent consumers from having price information. 84 Rather quickly it 
became a clash that has turned this set of interests on its head: the govern-
ment wishes to compel retailers and other commercial speakers to give con-
sumers certain information, and these speakers claim protection from such 
compulsion-using the doctrine that was initially concerned with ensuring 
77. See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court v. America, DEMOCRACY, Winter 
2012, at 46, 50-51; Marcia M. Boumil, Pharmaceutical Gift Laws and Commercial Speech 
Under the First Amendment in the Wake of Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 8 J. HEALTH & 
BIOMEDICAL L. 133, 162-70 (2012); David Gans, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Corporate Commer-
cial Speech in the Age of Citizens United, BALKINIZATION (June 23, 2011, 6:33 PM), 
http:/ lbalkin.b logspot.com/20 II /06/sorrell-v-ims-health-corporate.html. 
78. See Purdy, supra note 77, at 49-51. 
79. /d. at 50. 
80. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 
413 u.s. 376, 385 (1973)). 
81. /d. at 763. 
82. /d. at 765. 
83. /d. at 773. 
84. !d. at 759-60. 
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consumers were equipped with the commercial information in which they 
were likely interested. 
An important parallel branch of the commercial speech doctrine came 
into being in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio. 85 Here, the Court considered regulations on attorney adver-
tising. While striking down several of the prohibitions under the commercial 
speech doctrine as already discussed, the Court took a different view of the 
law that required certain disclosures to be made in the advertisements. 86 
Noting the "material differences between disclosure requirements and out-
right prohibitions on speech,"87 the Court found a real distinction between a 
statute that prevented attorneys "from conveying information to the public" 
and one that "required them to provide somewhat more information than 
they might otherwise be inclined to present."88 Identifying a well-informed 
public as the value underlying any protection for commercial speech, 89 the 
Court distinguished the statute in question from the compelled speech doc-
trine the Court had previously laid down in Wooley v. Maynard, 90 Miami 
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 91 and West Virginia State Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnette. 92 Instead of applying the "not more extensive" test of 
Central Hudson, 93 the Court held that "an advertiser's rights are adequately 
protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the 
State's interest in preventing deception of consumers."94 
Examining a series of regulations that governed solicitation of charita-
ble contributions, the Court distinguished Zauderer from Riley v. National 
85. 
86. 
87. 
88. 
89. 
90. 
91. 
92. 
93. 
(1980). 
471 u.s. 626,651 (1985). 
/d. at 650-53. 
/d. at 650. 
/d. 
/d. at 651. 
430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
94. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. It remains unanswered whether the only appropriate 
interest to support a state mandated disclosure in the commercial context is the prevention of 
deception. Preventing deception was the particular interest asserted by the state in Zauderer 
and in the more recent, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 
1340-41 (2010). Other courts have considered such compelled disclosure requirements where 
the state asserted another interest than the prevention of deception, and the Court accepted 
this interest and used the Zauderer test to determine the viability of the law. See N.Y. State 
Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133 (2d Cir. 2009); Pharm. Care Mgmt. 
Ass'n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294,310 n.8 (1st Cir. 2005); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 
832, 849-50 (9th Cir. 2003); Nat'! Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114-15 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
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Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc. 95 In assessing a regulation 
that required professional solicitors to disclose the fact that they were paid 
professionals to potential donors, the State argued that regardless of the 
protected status of charitable donations in general, the disclosure portion 
"regulate[ d) only commercial speech because it relate[ d) only to the profes-
sional fundraiser's profit from the solicited contribution."96 Without decid-
ing whether the speech identifying the speaker as a paid professional would 
alone constitute commercial speech, the Court laid out its "inextricably in-
tertwined" test, thus insulating mixed commercial and non-commercial 
speech. 97 The Court noted, "we do not believe that the speech retains its 
commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise 
fully protected speech."98 In Riley, the Court determined that the protected 
charitable solicitation was entwined with a report on the status of the solici-
tors to such a degree that the two could not be pulled apart. "[W]here, as 
here, the component parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined, 
we cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another 
test to another phrase. Such an endeavor would be both artificial and im-
practical. "99 
B. The Definitional Struggle Surrounding Commercial Speech 
The literature surrounding the commercial speech doctrine often re-
volves around the level of protection such speech should receive. But re-
gardless of one's position on this question, an antecedent question, one that 
indeed occupies much of the scholarship in this area, must first be an-
swered-what constitutes commercial speech? This definitional question 
must be answered not only in order to determine what speech deserves pro-
tection, but also to grasp the values that underlie the decision to protect cer-
tain speech as "commercial" while granting other speech the full protections 
of the First Amendment. 100 
The definition most often pointed to, as discussed in the previous Sec-
tion, is that commercial speech is speech that "does 'no more than propose a 
95. 487 U.S. 781, 796 n.9 (1988) (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 626) ("Purely com-
mercial speech is more susceptible to compelled disclosure requirements."). 
96. Id. at 795. 
97. Id. at 796. 
98. Id. Notable is the fact that this is almost the exact opposite conclusion that the 
Court came to in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983). 
99. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796. 
100. For an excellent discussion of this definitional problem, see Tamara R. Piety, "A 
Necessary Cost of Freedom"? The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REv. I, 36-40 
(2012). 
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commercial transaction. "' 101 The courts have also referred to commercial 
speech as that which "relate[s] solely to the economic interests of the speak-
er and its audience.'' 102 As the foregoing discussion of the case law demon-
strated, however, the actual practice of defining commercial speech at times 
reaches a broader category of speech. 103 Moving from the real world appli-
cation within the case law to the scholarship in this area allows for a focus 
not only on what actually constitutes commercial speech, but also on what 
should be included in that category. 
From one perspective, the lack of a clear defmition setting the bounds 
of commercial speech makes the commercial/non-commercial distinction all 
the more dangerous. One argument insists that, in order to justify this dis-
tinction, commercial speech can only constitute the most narrow reading 
arising from Virginia State Board of Pharmacy: "an offer to sell (X) good or 
service at (Y) price."104 Others still have insisted that, while perhaps the 
commercial speech definition was once broader than the "no more than pro-
pose a commercial transaction" definition, doctrinal development at the 
Court has limited the definition to this original description. 105 Another ar-
101. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 
413 u.s. 376, 385 (1973)). 
102. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 
(1980). 
103. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983). 
104. David F. McGowan, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CALIF. L. 
REv. 359,401 (1990) (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761). 
105. J. Wesley Earnhardt, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky: A Golden Opportunity to Define 
Commercial Speech-Why Wouldn't the Supreme Court Finally "Just Do It™"?, 82 N.C. L. 
REv. 797, 803 (2004) (arguing that the cases with a broader definition of commercial speech 
all predated United States v. United Foods, Inc., which offered the "'usual[]"' definition of 
commercial speech (quoting United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001))). 
While the Court has not made an explicit pronouncement regarding the definition of com-
mercial speech, Earnhardt's argument may have continuing viability in the current doctrinal 
environment where many commentators have observed the diminishing distinction between 
commercial and non-commercial speech. See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, No Need to Break New 
Ground: A Response to the Supreme Court's Threat to Overhaul the Commercial Speech 
Doctrine, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 389, 398 (2012) ("The Court has generally become more 
hostile to commercial speech restrictions along the way."); Tamara R. Piety, Against Free-
dom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 2583, 2584 (2008) ("[The] trend is to 
offer broader protection to commercial speech and corporate speakers than has been extend-
ed in the past. And it seems likely to culminate in a decision to do away with the distinction 
between protected commercial speech and other speech protected by the First Amend-
ment."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications 
of44 Liquormart, 1996 Sur. CT. REv. 123, 126 ("After Liquormart, it is unclear why 'com-
mercial speech' should continue to be treated as a separate category of speech isolated from 
general First Amendment principles."). Additionally, Richard Samp has urged that the most 
recent commercial speech decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. calls into question the con-
stitutional validity of numerous speech restrictions created by federal regulations. Richard 
Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free Speech or Resurrecting Lochner?, 2011 CATO 
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gument recognizes that this "'no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion'"106 definition "obviously meets any fair conception of commercial 
speech," 107 but goes on to argue that the definition is actually broader. 108 
While the "an offer to sell (X) good or service at (Y) price"109 definition 
tracks with the most limited defmition of commercial speech and appears to 
conform to perhaps the bulk of the case law, precedent is only built based 
on the facts of the cases that appear before a court. Professor Steven Shiffrin 
has further argued that because most of the commercial speech cases have 
looked at explicit advertising, the definition espoused by the Court and con-
sidered by commentators has missed a great deal of the speech that should 
be defined as commercial simply because these other types of speech were 
not before the courts in the genesis of the doctrine. 110 
The definition of commercial speech as speech that "relate[ s] solely to 
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience" 111 may appear to be 
only slightly different from the definition as "an offer to sell (X) good or 
service at (Y) price," 112 but this conclusion also depends on how expansive 
the category of economic interests is defined. In the aftermath of Nike v. 
Kasky, scholars considered why corporations were speaking and considered 
what mattered to a consumer in making their economic choices. In this con-
text, commercial speech could be defined as "[f]actual statements by a 
manufacturer to consumers about its products with the objective of increas-
ing sales." 113 It is not a stretch to argue that such statements, regardless of 
SuP. CT. REV. 129, 139-40. If this observation proves valid, there will be countless "commer-
cial speech" cases before the Court in coming years. !d. 
106. Nat Stem, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 Mo. 
L. REv. 55,79 (1999) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762). 
107. !d. 
108. !d. at 89 ("Rather than simplistically lumping together all instances in which a 
commercial entity speaks or solicitation occurs, the Court has sought to determine whether 
the content of a communication contains an essential, inextricable dimension of fully pro-
tected expression."). 
109. McGowan, supra note 104, at 401 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 
761). 
110. Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a 
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212, 1213 (1984) ("Each com-
mercial speech case the Court has considered has involved advertising or the proposal of a 
commercial transaction, and almost all of the commentators have looked at the 'commercial 
speech' problem through the lens of commercial advertising. The collective myopia has 
distorted something quite important: the commercial speech that has been beneath the protec-
tion of the first amendment for all these years has not been confined to commercial advertis-
ing." (citations omitted)). 
111. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 
(1980). 
112. McGowan, supra note 104, at 401 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 
761). 
113. Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 17, at 1145. 
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their particular subject matter, implicate the economic interests of the 
speaker. While the economic interests of the audience in this case may be 
less apparent, it is still plausible that they are indeed implicated. When a 
consumer makes a choice between products, regardless of the grounds upon 
which they are making that choice, they implicate economic interests be-
cause they are spending money in the economic sphere. That the consumer 
has chosen to have producers compete on grounds other than product or 
price does not undermine the fact that the consumer's economic interests are 
implicated. 114 
A variety of scholars have focused on the values underlying the First 
Amendment in an effort to construct a coherent picture of what exactly is 
commercial speech. The contours of commercial speech may be sketched 
out by identifying that speech which does not fulfill the values-namely, 
self-government and self-expression-that underlie the First Amendment. 115 
An examination of the motivations underlying the commercial speech doc-
trine urges that the "distinction [between core and commercial speech] turns 
on whether constitutional value attaches to participation in a given speech 
act, or whether constitutional value attaches instead only to the information 
conveyed by the speech act." 116 When speech does fulfill a core First 
Amendment value, then that particular speech perhaps cannot be defined as 
"commercial." 117 
Others, in arguing against the separate category of commercial speech, 
have looked not to the theory underlying that category, but posited that reg-
ulation of commercial speech may only be justified if the theoretical ques-
tion of what disqualifies such speech from the full protection of the First 
114. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product 
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REv. 525, 531, 584 
(2004) (discussing consumers' preference for certain goods not based on price or quality of 
goods, but upon the processes by which they are created). 
115. See, e.g., Piety, supra note 100; Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. 
REv. 748, 812-18 (1999); Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First 
Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 484-89 (1985); Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin 
Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. 
L. REv. I (1979); Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech, An Inquiry 
Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 352-55 (1978); C. Edwin 
Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1976). 
116. Post, supra note 28, at 20. Post also suggests a method by which to distinguish 
speech that does not fall within the commercial speech paradigm, not because it is accorded 
full First Amendment protection, but because it is not considered under the First Amend-
ment: "The doctrine seems to protect only the distribution of commercial information that 
reinforces a public communicative sphere by addressing strangers who are presumed to be 
independent and self-possessed. The doctrine stops short of commercial communications 
between persons deemed to be involved in relationships of dependence or reliance." /d. at 23. 
117. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 17, at 1111-33 (concluding that speech at issue 
in Nike v. Kasky has value in terms of democratic decisionmaking). 
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Amendment is answered. 118 This line of thought may even be loath to identi-
fy a definition of so-called "commercial speech," as it views this as an ille-
gitimate category--one that should not exist and one that should be replaced 
by more expansive speech protections for the type of speech contemplated 
by this Section. 119 
In addition to the effort to defme the category based upon constitu-
tional values, there is also an effort to focus the defmition of coiilmercial 
speech based upon consideration of the animating purpose of the doctrine 
itself. Arising out of the Court's original explanation in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy, 120 a number of scholars have stressed the value of pro-
tecting the free flow of information as the animating principle undergirding 
the commercial speech doctrine. Some attribute greater public value to this 
information flow, 121 while others appear to consider the information as a 
market necessity. 122 From the idea of information flow also must arise the 
recognition of the speech in question having value, not just for the speaker, 
but importantly for the listeners. 123 
118. See Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case 
for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REv. 777, 791-93 (1993). 
119. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. 
L. REv. 627 (1990); Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court and Commercial Speech: New 
Words with an Old Message, 72 MINN. L. REV. 289 (1987); Martin H. Redish, The First 
Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429,448-58 (1971). 
120. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 765 (1976) ("It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be 
intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indis-
pensable."). 
121. See, e.g., Post, supra note 28, at 4 (arguing that commercial speech "conveys 
information necessary for public decision making, but that does not itself form part of public 
discourse"). 
122. See, e.g., Pomeranz, supra note 105, at 402 ("[E]ssential aspects of the commer-
cial speech doctrine serve society's 'strong interest in the free flow of commercial infor-
mation' in order to protect and maintain transparent and efficient markets based on 'intelli-
gent and well informed' consumers." (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764-
65)). 
123. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763 ("As to the particular consumer's 
interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keen-
er by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate."); Piety, supra note 100, 
at 1 (arguing that the commercial speech "doctrine was not created to protect commercial 
speakers. It was created to carve out a limited area of First Amendment protection for truth-
ful commercial speech in order to protect consumers' right to receive accurate product in-
formation and to thereby promote the public interest in a properly functioning market"); Post, 
supra note 28, at 14 ("The Court's development of commercial speech doctrine closely 
tracks Meiklejohn's analysis. The Court has been quite explicit that commercial speech 
should be constitutionally protected so as to safeguard the circulation of information. It has 
therefore focused its analysis on the need to receive information, rather than on the rights of 
speakers."); Pomeranz, supra note 105, at 404-05 ('"[T]he extension of First Amendment 
protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the 
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Without a clear definition of commercial speech, there is also the dan-
ger of fully protected and not fully protected forms of speech collapsing into 
one another. Frederick Schauer has flagged the danger of "doctrinal dilu-
tion" should heightened First Amendment protection be accorded to com-
mercial speech. 124 '"[D]octrinal dilution' refers to the possibility that some 
existing [F]irst [A]mendment rule would lose some of its strength because 
of the number of unacceptable applications it would generate when its new 
applications were added."125 The danger in moving away from a separate 
test for commercial speech lies not in the regulation of that speech itself, but 
in what shifting protections mean for other speech-speech of the kind that 
most would prefer to see receive heightened First Amendment protection. 126 
William Van Alstyne raises a similar concern, labeled as the choice between 
leveling up and leveling down. 127 Recognizing that there have been signals 
within the doctrine that commercial speech should be subject to the same 
protections as core political speech, he notes: 
information such speech provides,' [so commercial actors'] 'constitutionally protected inter-
est in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal."' ( altera-
tion in original) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 
(1985))); Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: 
The Case of Menu Label Laws, 12 J. HEALTH CAREL. & PoL'Y 159, 181 (2009) ("In the 
commercial marketplace, the emphasis is on the receipt of information by consumers .... "). 
124. Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First 
Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1181, 1193-97 (1988). 
125. /d. at 1194. 
126. !d. at 1194-95. Schauer uses the example of misbranded products and the stric-
tures of the test in Brandenberg v. Ohio. !d. He notes, 
There can be no doubt, for example, that some commercial speech is likely to be 
harmful. Misbranded products are a good example. But restrictions on speech be-
cause of its harmfulness, in a system in which speech is protected despite its harm-
fulness, are normally permissible if and only if the requirements of Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, as further clarified in Hess v. Indiana, are satisfied. And it is clear that what-
ever the likelihood of harm would be in a misbranded product case, the possibility 
that the imminence and incitement standards of current law would be satisfied is 
virtually nonexistent. Thus, were existing first amendment rules to be applied to 
commercial speech, the choice, in the future development of the law, would be be-
tween holding almost all of product misrepresentation law unconstitutional, or of 
modifying the Brandenburg test so that it would then permit the regulation of mis-
branded products. It is by no means inconceivable that the Supreme Court, faced 
with these as the only alternatives, would choose the latter course. The conse-
quence of that, it can be seen, is that Brandenburg, having been weakened to ac-
commodate the inevitable regulability of misbranded products, remains weakened 
as a protector of the kinds of political argument it was originally designed to pro-
tect. 
!d. (citations omitted). 
127. William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some Cautionary Notes 
on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1635 (1996); see also Pomeranz, supra note 105, 
at 432-34 (cautioning against "an erosion of the commercial speech doctrine without any 
serious consideration of its consequences"). 
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The choice must be made, that is, either to "level up" commercial speech to the 
high plateau of core political speech or to "level down" political speech to the low 
plateau of commercial speech, or perhaps to have them meet somewhere in be-
tween. If the one sort of speech is to be acknowledged as "as much within" or "as 
well within" the First Amendment as the other, these are the evident choices to be 
made-to unifY the standards, and so have them generally treated indistinguisha-
bly.l28 
61 
It is apparent from both the case law and the scholarship that the defi-
nition of commercial speech is a topic of much disagreement. Within this 
dialogue are efforts both to describe what commercial speech is, by refer-
ence to the way courts have developed the doctrine, as well as to posit what 
commercial speech should be--claims differently rooted in expanding or 
contracting the definition. It is against this backdrop that this Article seeks 
to carve out a space to reach the speech of "free" service providers. 
Questions surrounding what is included in the category of commercial 
speech-and what is left out, either as core speech or as speech not within 
the First Amendment's ambit--continue to abound. With the seemingly 
ever-increasing number of Internet and technology companies, new actors 
are engaging in new forms of speech, which do not fit within traditional 
categories of commercial and non-commercial speech, but which society 
may be concerned with regulating. The commercial speech doctrine, though 
sometimes considered broader than transactional speech, 129 nonetheless usu-
ally hinges on the definition of speech that "does 'no more than propose a 
commercial transaction."' 130 In the face of new market models, this concept 
of a commercial transaction needs to be unpacked. 
II. RISE OF NEW ECONOMY BUSINESS MODELS 
In addition to the already existing definitional struggles in the area of 
commercial speech, the development of new business models by some of 
the largest commercial enterprises in the global economy is likely to 
strain-or at least stretch-the doctrine, which was developed to deal with 
more traditional direct fmancial fee-for-service or product purchasing trans-
actions. Web-based titans like Facebook and Google, and rising powers like 
128. Van Alstyne, supra note 127, at 1640. 
129. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983) (hold-
ing that an advertisement did not propose a transaction, but was commercial speech); Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (defining com-
mercial speech as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its 
audience"). 
130. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 
413 u.s. 376, 385 (1973)). 
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Pinterest, 131 have abandoned direct financial transactions, instead selling 
consumer data to advertisers for profit. Consumers, in turn, have begun to 
expect that web-based services like social networking and search engines 
will be provided for free. However, despite the shift away from the tradi-
tional financial relationships that underlay the commercial speech test, it 
appears that all parties-web companies, consumers, and government ac-
tors-assume that the content that passes between the company and the con-
sumer can be regulated. 
A. From Fee-for-Service to Commodifying the Consumer 
In direct contrast with the above-described iterations of the commer-
cial speech test as articulated by courts and scholars, 132 the predominant 
business model of social media and other Web 2.0 ventures 133 is not a fee-
for-service model. Rather, websites such as Facebook, Pinterest, Google, 
Bing, and Twitter raise revenue through indirect means. Instead of charging 
their users a fee for access to the social media site, these companies sell 
their users' personal information and user-generated content (UGC) to third 
parties. By providing a free, attractive service that encourages users to share 
personal information and content, 134 social networking sites are able to gen-
erate value by virtue of their ability to sell behavioral advertisements lever-
aged against user data, identifying for advertisers the likes and dislikes of 
131. Pinterest recently raised $100 million in additional capital at a $1.5 billion val-
uation for the company. Matthew Yglesias, ?interest Gets $1.5 Billion Valuation, SLATE 
(May 17, 2012, 12:11 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/20 12/05117 /pinterest_ s _I_ 5 _billion_ valuation.html. 
This high valuation is perhaps partially because the demographics of Pinterest users-
predominantly women "between the ages of 25 and 54" with an average annual household 
income between $50,000 and $70,000-are a group highly coveted by advertisers. Eve May-
er Orsburn, Why You Should Be Using ?interest to Pick Up Women, FORBES (May 29, 2012, 
I :03 PM), http://www. forbes.corn/sites/womensmedia/20 12/05/29/why-you-should-be-
using-pinterest-to-pick-up-chicks/. For some industries, "Pinterest now [generates] more 
referral traffic than Twitter." Jordan Crook, ?interest Now Generates More Referral Traffic 
than Twitter: Study, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 8, 2012), 
http:/ /techcrunch. corn/2 0 12/0 3/08/pi nterest-now-generates-more-referral-traffic-than-twitter-
study/. 
132. See supra Sections LA-B. 
133. "'Web 2.0,' is fundamentally about what we use computers to do. We have 
moved from creating documents in Microsoft Office to living life online: searching on 
Google, buying and selling on eBay, watching the newest viral video on Y ouTube, and hang-
ing out with our friends on mySpace and Facebook." Randal C. Picker, Competition and 
Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. CoLLOQUY I, 2 (2008). 
134. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, YouTube, UGC, and Digital Music: Competing 
Business and Cultural Models in the Internet Age, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. 431,431-32 (2010). 
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potential customers. 135 Likewise, search engines like Google and Bing do 
not directly charge users for the search service, but rather profit136 from ad-
vertisers' ability to target advertisements to particular users based on current 
and prior search terms. 137 
While UGC websites have often been celebrated for enabling an ex-
plosion of creative content on the Internet-from music to political com-
mentary138-the less-discussed side of the UGC revolution has been the 
explanation of why websites have been actively facilitating UGC. As users 
generate and post content through UGC sites, they create an ever-increasing 
amount of data about themselves and their friends that the sites can "sell 
against" to advertisers. 139 Likewise, as search engines become better able to 
135. "[W]hile behavioral advertising is sometimes used as a synonym for behavioral 
targeting, behavioral advertising should be understood as the use of behavioral targeting for 
advertising purposes." Dustin D. Berger, Balancing Consumer Privacy with Behavioral 
Targeting, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 3, 17 (2011) (citations omitted); 
see also Peter P. Swire, Peeping, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1167, 1195 (2009). This Article 
refers to advertising that uses UGC or other personal user information to target advertising as 
behavioral advertising. 
136. See 2012 Financial Tables, GoOGLE INVESTOR REL., 
http://investor.google.com/financial/tables.htrnl (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). In 2011 alone, 
Google reported advertising revenues of over $30 billion, though these earnings were de-
scribed by some as "disappointing." Larry Kim, What Industries Contributed to Google 's 
$37.9 Billion in 2011 Revenues?, WORDSTREAM BLOG (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2012/0l/23/google-revenues. 
137. It is important to note that this Article does not take a position on the utility of 
behavioral advertising or whether government regulation of such advertising is advisable. 
There are consumer benefits, as well as privacy risks, to advertisements that are purportedly 
personalized to an individual. See, e.g., Ben Kunz, Go Ahead, Facebook. Sell That Data, 
Bus. WK. (May 26, 2010), 
http:/ /www.businessweek.com/technology/contentlmay20 I O/tc20 I 00526 _720314.htrn (not-
ing that "[ c ]onsumers have grown comfortable being tracked in databases, because, frankly, 
it's often useful"). But see Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2012, 6:07 PM), 
http:// online. wsj.com/article/SB I 000 l424052702304458604577488822667325882.html ?mo 
d=djemalertTECH (describing how a travel site creates a price differential for hotel rooms 
based on user data, including computer type). Rather, this Article seeks to focus on how new 
technologies and business models interact with the commercial speech doctrine's focus on 
direct commercial transactions. 
138. Arewa, supra note 134, at 432 (citing Andrew Keen & David Weinberger, The 
Good, the Bad, and the "Web 2.0," WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2007), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB ll8461274162567845.html?mod=Technology); Jeannine M. 
Marques, Note, Fair Use in the 21st Century: Bill Graham and Blanch v. Koons, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 331, 331 (2007) ("You Tube, MySpace, Blogspot, and countless other 
websites offer amateur creators (and even professional content companies like CBS) the 
opportunity to produce innovative content and to post it immediately and freely to a world-
wide audience."). 
139. See, e.g., Mark Sullivan, How Will Facebook Make Money?, PCWORLD (June 
14, 2010, 10:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/198815/how_will_facebook_make_ 
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track their web traffic and create searcher profiles, they are able to leverage 
that data for increased advertising revenues. 140 The complaint in a recently-
settled class action suit against Facebook quoted Mark Zuckerberg as saying 
that a "'trusted referral is the Holy Grail of advertising. "' 141 Likewise, the 
same complaint "quotes Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg [as] stating that 
'[m]aking your customers your marketers' is 'the illusive goal we've been 
searching for. "' 142 Although there is some controversy as to the potential 
profitability of the websites using consumer information to sell behavioral 
advertising, 143 at least some sources have attempted to place a direct valua-
tion on the personal information and UGC posted by consumers. 144 A 2009 
study estimated the price of behavioral advertising at "2.68 times the price 
of untargeted advertising.'' 145 ill addition to sales of behavioral advertising, 
Web 2.0 companies raise money merely by virtue of their large user bases. 
That is, the more users a web service is able to attract, the more advertisers 
will be willing to pay to have exposure to a larger audience. 146 Thus, there 
money.html (describing several ways in which Facebook leverages against user data for 
profit). 
140. See, e.g., Ryan Singe!, How Does Google Make the Big Bucks? An lnfographic 
Answer, WIRED (July 19, 2011, 10:44 AM), http://www.wired.com/business/2011/07/google-
revenue-sources; Steven Levy, Secret of Googlenomics: Data-Fueled Recipe Brews Profita-
bility, WIRED (May 22, 2009), http://www.wired.com/culture/culturereviews/magazine/17-
06/nep _googlenomics?currentPage=all. 
141. Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 791-92 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting 
Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages at~ 43, Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 
(No. CV 11-0 1726), http:/ /www.dmlp.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/20 11-06-06-
2ndAmendedComplaint.pdf (challenging Facebook's "Sponsored Stories" ads under Califor-
nia state law protecting individuals' right to publicity). Perhaps because this suit survived a 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Facebook settled with Plaintiffs. /d. at 815; see Dan Levine, 
Facebook Settles Lawsuit Over "Sponsored Stories," REUTERS (May 22, 2012, 6:53 PM), 
http://www .reuters.com/article/20 12/05/22/us-face book -settlement-
idUSBRE84L16920120522. 
142. Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 792 (second alteration in original) (quoting Second 
Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages at~ 43). 
143. See, e.g., Jean-Louis Gassee, Mobile Advertising: The $20B Opportunity Mi-
rage, MONDAY NOTE (June 10,2012, 10:39 PM), http://www.mondaynote.com/2012/06110/ 
mobile-advertising-the-20b-opportunity-mirage/. 
144. Alexis C. Madrigal, How Much Is Your Data Worth? Mmm, Somewhere Be-
tween Half a Cent and $1,200, ATLANTIC (Mar. 19, 2012, 3:18 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/12/03/how-much-is-your-data-worth-mmm-
somewhere-between-half-a-cent-and-1200/254730/ (describing various methods of evaluat-
ing the monetary value of a single user's data). 
145. CATHERINE TUCKER, THE ECONOMICS VALUE OF ONLINE CUSTOMER DATA 15 
(2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/intemet/ieconomy/46968839.pdf (citing HOWARD 
BEALES, THE VALUE OF BEHAVIORAL TARGETING (20 I 0), available at 
http://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/Beales_NAI_Study.pdf); see also Ira S. Rubinstein, 
Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409, 1440 (2011). 
146. See, e.g., Alexis C. Madrigal, The Big Digg Lesson: A Social Network Is Worth 
Precisely as Much as Its Community, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2012, 6:14 PM), 
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are two ways that the new online economy capitalizes on providing free 
services to users: (1) the more traditional route of creating a venue where a 
large number of eyes can be turned towards advertisements; and (2) the 
newer route of leveraging against user data to create targeted advertisements 
and consumer dossiers. 
While this fast-rising business model poses interesting questions for 
corporate valuation and consumer privacy, this Article focuses on the impli-
cations that an indirect monetization of consumer content has on the viabil-
ity of the commercial speech doctrine as currently formulated. 
B. User Expectations 
Perhaps part of the shift away from a fee-for-service business model 
and towards a data-driven model that leverages the size of a user base and 
the users' information has to do with shifting user expectations. The expec-
tations of users of social networking and search engine sites may further 
undermine the traditional relationship between commercial actor and con-
sumer-and therefore also undermine the current concept of commerce un-
derlying the commercial speech doctrine. 
As some scholars have noted, the rise of UGC-driven sites has upset, 
if not destroyed, the traditional business models of the cultural industry. 147 
Likewise, the rise of free services on the Internet-whether those services 
are search engines, social media, photo sharing, or other services-has cre-
ated a user expectation that Internet services be free. 148 Few people today 
would imagine paying for basic search engine access, use of a service like 
Facebook, 149 or even web-based political and news content. 150 Although 
some news sites have attempted to maintain profitability by moving to a 
fee-for-service model, such moves have largely been met with consumer 
http://www. theatlantic.com/technology/archive/20 12/07 /the-big-digg-lesson-a-social-
network-is-worth-precisely-as-much-as-its-community/259770/ ("There is one clear lesson 
from Digg's sale: the technology that powered a once-massive social network is worth about 
$500,000. All the rest of the value derives from the people that use it. Though scaling is 
tough, any developer in the world can build some profiles and let people connect up. It's an 
act of genius--or an act of God, by which I mean luck-to design a site constitution that 
makes people want to build their online lives at your URL (or in your app). Social network-
ing companies are not technology companies as much as they are community companies."). 
147. Arewa, supra note 134, at 436-37. 
148. !d. at 442 ("Users increasingly expect digital content to be cheap or free."). 
149. FACEBOOK, supra note 5 (stating, "It's free and always will be"); Ben Parr, No, 
Facebook Will Not Make You Pay to Get the New Profiles, MASHABLE (Sept. 25, 2011), 
hrtp://mashable.com/2011/09/25/facebook-changes-are-free/. 
150. Berger, supra note 135, at 32 (noting consumers reaping benefits of free ser-
vices). 
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resistance and even outrage. 151 So, in some ways, consumers have chosen to 
"pay" for their web services by allowing their information and participation 
in the site to be sold against, and by being exposed to behavioral advertise-
ments.152 
At the same time, consumers remain wary of the privacy policies of 
the major online powers. 153 Although the services are free, consumers are 
often troubled 154 by the frequent stories of data collection, 155 privacy breach-
es, 156 and changing terms of service. 157 Interestingly, these concerns do not 
appear to affect the customer volume or market dominance of sites like Fa-
151. See, e.g., Noah Davis, STUDY: Nearly Everyone Dislikes Paying for Entertain-
ment Online, Bus. INSIDER (June 1, 2011, 2:53PM), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-
06-0 1/entertainment/3000 1918 _1_ entertainment-on1ine-study-profit-motive#ixzz 1 z3bcu3vh; 
Public Finds Less Value in Entertainment Industry, Is Unhappy About Paying, DENVER Bus. 
J. (May 30, 2011, 2:12 PM), http://www.bizjoumals.com/denver/news/2011/05/30/public-
finds-less-value-in.html ?page=all. 
152. Picker, supra note 133, at 6 ("I paid cash for Outlook but I 'pay' for Gmail by 
being exposed to the advertisements that it places on the far right edge of the screen."); see 
also Swire, supra note 135, at 1195 ("[A]n emerging argument is that behavioral advertising 
is essential to pay for 'free' content online-this type of advertising is the last, best hope for 
the newspaper industry to pay for investigative journalism and the other expenses of an inde-
pendent news media."). 
153. See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, MOBILE PRIVACY: A USER'S PERSPECTIVE: SUMMARY 
FINDINGS 6 (2011), available at 
http://www.truste.com/why _ TRUSTe _privacy_ services/harris-mobile-survey/TRUSTe-
Mobile-Privacy-Report-Summary.pdf (finding that privacy is the primary concern of many 
mobile Internet users, with "98% of consumers express[ing] a strong desire for better con-
trols over how their personal information is collected and used via mobile devices and apps," 
and "85% want[ing] to be able to opt into or out of targeted mobile ads"). 
154. Andrew B. Serwin, Privacy 3.0-The Principle of Proportionality, 42 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 869, 872 (2009) ("Despite the proliferation of privacy laws in the United States, 
more and more people feel they have less protection for their personal information."). 
155. For example, Target recently acknowledged that its data collection practices 
enabled its stores to be able to identify pregnant customers and send them targeted advertis-
ing early in pregnancy, which made some customers '"queasy."' Kashmir Hill, How Target 
Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012, 
11 :02 AM), http://www. forbes.com/sites/kashmirhilV20 12/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-
teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/ (quoting Andrew Pole, Target statistician). 
156. In the latest of a long string of data breaches, both Linkedln and eHarmony 
notified consumers in the spring of 2012 that breaches were affecting large numbers of con-
sumer passwords. Hayley Tsukayama, Linkedln, eHarmony Deal with Breach Aftermath, 
WASH. PosT (June 7, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/linkedin-
eharmony-deal-with-breach-aftermath/20 12/06/07 /gJQA wqs5KV _ story.html. 
157. See cwalters, Facebook's New Terms of Service: "We Can Do Anything We 
Want with Your Content. Forever.," CONSUMERIST (Feb. 15, 2009), 
http:/lconsumerist.com/2009/02/facebooks-new-terms-of-service-we-can-do-anything-we-
want-with-your-content-forever.html (describing a unilateral change to the Facebook Terms 
of Service that "grant Facebook an irrevocable, perpetual, non-exclusive, transferable, fully 
paid, worldwide license" to use UGC, even after a user terminates his or her account). 
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cebook. 158 Consumers of dominant web services, therefore, are in a position 
where they may feel locked into using that site 159 but have no bargaining 
power to ensure that their data is well looked-after. 160 The sole decision 
point for consumers is at the initial sign-u{T-the companies' websites, ad-
vertisements, and terms of service should lay out data use, privacy policies, 
and other corporate terms. But what happens if those sources provide untrue 
or confusing information about how consumer data will be used? 
Consumers are not in a particularly good position to correct mislead-
ing information through litigation or to demand further information that the 
company may be unwilling to provide. 161 First, consumers are usually fairly 
unaware of the data use practices of the web services they use because the 
behavioral targeting is often invisible to the consumer. 162 This is compound-
ed by the fairly fluid nature of data use policies. 163 Further, the policies of 
websites regarding data use are often very difficult for even savvy consum-
ers to understand. 164 These features of the user-website relationship make it 
difficult for consumers to determine whether a site's written policies or ad-
158. "[C]onsumers' self-reported attitudes about the high importance of privacy to 
their online shopping decisions do not always match their actual behavior." Rubinstein, 
supra note 145, at 1443. 
159. "By merely participating in the Internet economy, consumers lose control over 
which details about their private lives are known .... " Berger, supra note 135, at 19. 
160. !d. at 46. Virtually all of these on-line terms of service are '"take-it-or-leave-it'" 
propositions. !d. If a user is unwilling to agree to the terms of service, she will be unable to 
access the product. !d. Furthermore, the data input to such services via UGC is generally held 
permanently by the service provider. See cwalters, supra note 157. Even if a user no longer 
consents to the terms of service, leaves the website, or the company changes its terms, the 
user can only withdraw prospectively; all of the submitted data remains in the hands of the 
service provider. !d. 
161. Berger, supra note 135, at 34. While a handful of laws grant individuals the right 
to see what data is held about them in the financial context, see Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1681-168lx (2006) (including the right to access credit reports and submit correc-
tions) and Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3404(c) (2006) (stating the customers 
right to access a report of all disclosures made to the government by financial institutions), 
this is not the norm and only reaches a very limited subset of the data held about an individu-
al. 
162. The fact that consumers are relatively unaware of such practices may be what 
allows them to be so effective: 
Profilers certainly benefit from their obscurity when it comes to avoiding liability 
for inappropriate disclosure. Even if a consumer suspected that the contents of his 
profile had been inappropriately used or disclosed, it would be difficult for him to 
discern which profiler was at fault, and, therefore, which company to contact or, 
perhaps, to sue. Because consumers lack this information, they may be without ef-
fective legal recourse when a profiler's use of behavioral targeting harms them. 
Berger, supra note 135, at 15 (citations omitted). 
163. Seeid.at47-48. 
164. FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR 
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 34-35 (2009), available at 
http://www. ftc.gov/ os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf. 
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vertisements provide them with accurate information sufficient to allow 
them to make an informed decision. Additionally, even if users were able to 
determine that they were misled by site advertisements or policies, it would 
likely be difficult to prove that they were damaged165-a required element 
of a false advertising or unlawful business practices cause of action in many 
states. 166 After all, it is difficult to determine the exact damages caused by a 
false or misleading data use policy to a user who was not paying for site 
access. 
C. Present Regulation by the Federal Government 
Despite the indirect financial relationship between Web 2.0 businesses 
and their users, it appears that both federal regulators and the companies 
themselves have assumed that false or misleading advertisements or terms 
of service can be regulated. 167 However, limited regulatory authority and 
companies' First Amendment rights may constrain the effectiveness of such 
regulations. 
As many commentators have noted, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) has a rather limited scope of authority in regulating Internet compa-
nies.168 The FTC is enabled by the Federal Trade Commission Act to regu-
165. Serwin, supra note 154, at 874, 885. 
166. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 17204 (West 2012) (allowing suit only "by 
a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the 
unfair competition"); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW§ 349 (McKinney 2012) (allowing suit for decep-
tive business practices only by the Attorney General and the individual who had been in-
jured); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(1) (2012); TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) 
(West 2012) (requiring the consumer show damages to prevail on deceptive trade practices 
claim). 
167. This Article does not consider the regulation of how such companies may use 
the data they have collected. The actual ways that such service providers use their users' 
individual data remains an area of appropriate concern for regulation and study. With our 
focus on terms of service and advertisements, we are not dismissing the real privacy con-
cerns attached to appropriate data usage; they simply lie outside the scope of this Article. For 
an excellent consideration of data privacy and the First Amendment, see generally Richards, 
supra note 12. 
168. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 135, at 41-42; Anne Keaty, Roger J. Johns & Lucy 
L. Henke, Can Internet Service Providers and Other Secondary Parties Be Held Liable for 
Deceptive Online Advertising?, 58 Bus. LAW. 479, 493-94 (2002). Aside from a limited 
grant of authority, some commentators have recently noted that the FTC's lack of resources 
and bureaucratic barriers have left it unable to even investigate many sites' privacy practices. 
Peter Maass, How a Lone Grad Student Scooped the Government and What It Means for 
Your Online Privacy, MOTHER JONES (June 29, 2012, 2:00 AM), 
http:/ /m.mothetjones.corn/media/20 12/06/stanford-grad-student -scooped-ftc-on! ine-privacy-
regulation (reporting on the FTC's resource and hardware shortcomings, which include the 
inability of investigators to access most websites from their work computers, and using cell 
phone tethers and other "workaround[s]" to access sites under investigation). 
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late unfair and deceptive trade practices in or affecting commerce. 169 The 
FTC considers advertising to be deceptive if there is a material representa-
tion, omission, act, or practice that is likely to mislead reasonable consum-
ers.170 The FTC has interpreted the materiality requirement broadly to in-
clude any information '"important to a consumer's decision to buy or use 
the product. "'171 
The FTC has taken this mandate 172 and applied it to regulate the be-
havior of websites offering free services to users that are false, misleading, 
or unclear about their data use policies. 173 In addition to publishing self-
regulatory principles for online behavioral advertising 174 and issuing rec-
ommendations for a privacy framework, 175 in the last two years, the FTC 
brought enforcement actions against two Web 2.0 titans-Facebook and 
Google. 176 The orders obtained by the FTC in the Google and Facebook 
enforcement actions required, among other things, that the companies obtain 
consumers' affirmative consent before materially changing their data prac-
tices or policies. 177 The actions also resulted in both companies agreeing to 
create companywide privacy programs that would be assessed by outside 
auditors over the next two decades. 178 
169. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006) (listing what is also known as § 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act). 
170. Keaty, Johns & Henke, supra note 168, at 487-88. 
171. See id. at 487 (quoting FED. TRADE COMM'N, ADVERTISING PRACTICES: 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: ANSWERS FOR SMALL BUSINESS 3 (2001), available at busi-
ness.ftc.gov/sites/defauit/files/pdf/bus35-advertising-faqs-guide-small-business.pdf); Letter 
from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to John D. Dingell, Chairman, 
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983), reprinted in 
Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984), 1984 WL 565319 app. at *45; see also FED. 
TRADE COMM'N, supra, at 3 (describing the materiality standard and giving examples). 
172. 15U.S.C.§45(a). 
173. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., No. 092 3184 (Fed. Trade Comm'n 2011) [hereinafter 
Agreement Containing Consent Order, Facebook, Inc.], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/111129facebookagree.pdf (agreement containing 
consent order); Google Inc., No. 102 3136 (Fed. Trade Comm'n 2011) [hereinafter Agree-
ment Containing Consent Order, Google, Inc.], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/l 023136/11 0330googlebuzzagreeorder.pdf (agreement con-
taining consent order). 
174. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 164, at i-iv. 
175. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 22, at v. 
176. Complaint, Facebook, Inc., supra note 25; Complaint, Google Inc., No. 102 
3136 (Fed. Trade Comm'n 2011) (No. C-4336), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1 023136/111 024googlebuzzcmpt.pdf; see also Complaint, 
MySpace L.L.C., No. 102 3058 (Fed. Trade Comm'n 2012) (No. C-), available at 
http://www. ftc.gov/os/caselist/1 02305 8/120508myspacecmpt. pdf. 
177. Agreement Containing Consent Order, Facebook, Inc., supra note 173, at 4-5; 
Agreement Containing Consent Order, Google Inc., supra note 173, at 4. 
178. Agreement Containing Consent Order, Facebook, Inc., supra note 173, at 5-6; 
Agreement Containing Consent Order, Google Inc., supra note 173, at 4-5; see also Alma 
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The FTC enforcement actions and subsequent settlements strongly 
imply that both the FTC and the regulated entities believe that the transac-
tions between purveyors of free web services and their users is a commer-
cial one. This is in contrast to purveyors of free services in another context. 
In at least three federal cases brought by so-called crisis pregnancy centers, 
the centers have made the argument that because their medical and personal 
counseling services are offered for free, the government can neither compel 
disclosures to correct false and misleading information about the services 
offered by these clinics nor regulate any false or misleading advertisements 
made by the clinics. 179 At least three federal courts have found these argu-
ments persuasive in the context of compelled disclosures. 180 Under the 
standard suggested by these cases, companies like Facebook and Google 
could falsely advertise their services with impunity, and the government 
would be unable to compel data use or other privacy disclosures. 181 
To date, companies like Facebook and Google have not challenged 
regulation under the FTCA of false or misleading practices vis-a-vis their 
users. This does not mean, however, that First Amendment defenses are not 
being raised in consumer suits against such companies. For example, in two 
class actions brought against Facebook for its "Sponsored Stories" (adver-
tisements using a friend's "like" of a commercial entity's Facebook page) 
under a California statute prohibiting commercial use of a person's likeness 
without consent, 182 Facebook raised as a defense that such "likes" were 
newsworthy and therefore could not be restricted by the California law. 183 
Whitten, An Update on Buzz, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Mar. 30, 2011), 
http://goog1eb1og.b1ogspot.com/20 11/03/update-on-buzz.html; Elliot Schrage, The Facebook 
Site Governance Vote, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (June I, 2012), 
http://newsroom.fb.com/News/371/The-Facebook-Site-Governance-Vote ("[W]e have en-
tered into a settlement agreement with the Federal Trade Commission which involves regular 
audits of our privacy practices .... "). 
179. See Greater Bait. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Bait., 683 F .3d 
539, 552-53 (4th Cir. 2012); Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 683 F.3d 591, 594 (4th 
Cir. 2012), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 779 F. Supp. 2d 456,463 (D. Md. 2011); Evergreen 
Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); O'Brien v. Mayor of Bait., 
768 F. Supp. 2d 804, 813-14 (D. Md. 2011). 
180. Greater Bait. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 683 F.3d at 552-53; Centro 
Tepeyac, 683 F.3d at 594; Evergreen Ass'n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 205; O'Brien, 768 F. Supp. 
2d at 813-14. 
181. While this Article clearly is not discussing abortion, these cases make an inter-
esting parallel as both scenarios implicate the constitutional right of privacy on the consumer 
side. 
182. See Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages, supra note 141, at 
2; Original Complaint at 5-6, E.K.D. ex rei. Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 894 
(S.D. Ill. 2012) (No. 3:11-461-GPM), http://www.scribd.com/doc/56981760/E-K-D-v-
Facebook-Complaint; see also CAL. Civ. CODE§ 3344(a) (West 2012). 
183. Facebook, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Class Action Complaint at 
17-22, Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. CV 11-01726); 
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Also of note, Google recently commissioned scholar Eugene Volokh to 
draft a white paper outlining the argument that Google search results are 
fully protected speech. 184 While neither of these examples raises issues re-
lated to the advertising or terms of service of social networking sites or 
search engines, they suggest that such web companies are not shy about 
raising First Amendment defenses where they perceive them to exist. 
III. REDEFINING THE COMMERCIAL IN AN INFORMATION ECONOMY 
A. Audience-Focused Conception of Commercial Speech 
Looking back across the early cases that gave rise to First Amendment 
protection for commercial speech, an important difference between com-
mercial and non-commercial speech is noticeable. Where non-commercial 
speech cases concern themselves primarily with the speaker, 185 commercial 
speech is expressly concerned with the audience. 186 There are different val-
ues that motivate the protection of commercial speech as compared to non-
commercial speech: 
Whereas communication within "public discourse" is protected both because of its 
participatory value to a speaker and because of its informational value to an audi-
ence, "[a] commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much be-
cause it pertains to the seller's business as because it furthers the societal interest in 
the 'free flow of commercial information."' 187 
This focus on the listener in assessing commercial speech is particular-
ly important because, regardless of the type of speech, a speaker presumes 
an audience. The perspective of this audience only seems to rise to the level 
of constitutional concern in the realm of commercial speech. Thus some 
visions of commercial speech attempt to define the speech itself by looking 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for More Definite Statement or Dismissal, supra 
note I, at 15-18. 
I84. VOLOKH & FALK, supra note I, at 6-20. A white paper is a report written by an 
expert in order to help readers understand an issue or make a decision. Such papers are main-
ly used in business and government decisionmaking. 
I85. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-II (1974) (per curiam) 
(focusing on speaker's "intent to convey a particularized message"). 
I86. Post, supra note 28, at 14 (noting that the Supreme Court has "focused its 
[commercial speech] analysis on the need to receive information, rather than on the rights of 
speakers"). 
I87. Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech 
and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 555, 559 (2006) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Hustler Magazine, 
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (I988)); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 
682-83 (I986); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985); 
First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (I978) (quoting Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)). 
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to the expectations of the audience, rather than of the speaker, or at least on 
an equal footing with the speaker's expectations. 188 It has not been the case 
that the simple exchange of money, the "commercial transaction," makes 
the speech at hand commercial. 189 If the courts are able to conceive of inter-
actions where money is expressly exchanged as non-commercial, it is rather 
the expectations of the audience that suggest whether speech should be cat-
egorized as commercial or non-commercial. 
Thus, audience--or dare we say, consumer in this context-
expectations appear to undergird some of the defmitional distinctions made 
in the commercial speech context. As in Murdock, where the audience ex-
pected the relationship to be religious as opposed to commercial--even 
though accompanied by "an offer to sell (X) good or service at (Y) 
price" 190-the court determined that it was in fact religious, fully-protected 
speech. 191 We could conceive of this determination being reversed where the 
audience expected the relationship to be a commercial one. Focusing on 
consumer expectations provides a relatively clear dividing line to classify 
commercial and non-commercial speech and is likely sufficient for many 
commercial relationships. 
However, in the new digital economy, we must question whether this 
consumer-focused paradigm will actually reach the speech with which regu-
lators, academics, and even the Web 2.0 companies themselves are interest-
ed.192 It is conceivable that users----consumers--of some of the largest Inter-
net companies do not imagine their relationship to be one encompassing a 
commercial transaction. With the trajectory of development of social media, 
search engines, email, and other web services being offered to the consumer 
at no monetary charge, it is more than likely that consumers expect use of 
these services not to create a classic economic relationship. 193 And it is all 
the more likely, with the expectation of receiving these services for free, 
that users will be wholly unwilling to revert to a paradigm where one is 
charged money for each use. 194 
188. See Post, supra note 28, at 40; Pomeranz, supra note I 05, at 423. 
189. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, Ill (1943) (holding that 
where an audience understood the religious nature of the speech, "the mere fact that the 
religious literature is 'sold' by itinerant preachers rather than 'donated' does not transform 
evangelism into a commercial enterprise"). 
190. McGowan, supra note 104, at 401 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 
761). 
191. Murdock, 319 U.S. at Ill. 
192. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
193. See FACEBOOK, supra note 5 (stating, "It's free and always will be"). 
194. See, e.g., Parr, supra note 149 (noting that rumors of Facebook beginning to 
charge for use circulating Internet at various intervals have caused great uproar); see also 
supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text. 
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Furthermore, when facing new products that operate on a different 
economic playing field than "an offer to sell (X) good or service at (Y) 
price," 195 it is quite likely that uniform consumer expectations may not yet 
even exist. For new relationships that look like classic transactions-that is, 
those for which people have a point of reference from the rest of their life 
experiences-the consumer expectations model will likely still reach the 
speech in which there is a valid interest in regulating. For relationships that 
do not have this touchstone within previous experience, however, there is 
cause for concern that an audience-focused approach will not reach the 
speech in which there is a valid regulatory interest. When entirely new eco-
nomic models are rolled out, there are not yet consumer expectations tied to 
them, and thus an audience-focused approach may fall short of that speech 
we would want to be included within that realm of commercial speech. 
B. Commercial Speech, Consumer Expectations, and Shifting Norms 
A commercial speech test that focuses on the audience-that is, on the 
expectations of the speech consumer-might not capture the speech with 
which this Article is concerned. The advertisements of free services like 
Facebook, Google, Twitter, Bing, and Pinterest do not propose what a con-
sumer might consider to be a "commercial transaction." Consumers general-
ly do not conceptualize their relationship with free online services as being 
a commercial one in the "(X) good or service at (Y) price" 196 context. Ra-
ther, consumer expectations of these services are that they are free ser-
vices. 197 As discussed in Part II, the norm has shifted such that individuals 
expect as a default that their social media, search engines, and other web 
services will be provided free of charge. 198 In the face of frequent, unsub-
stantiated reports of Facebook moving to a pay-for-use model, 199 Facebook 
has worked hard to dispel these rumors, going so far as to put on the initial 
sign-up page that the service will always be free. 200 
Some savvy consumers may realize that their relationship with web 
services is not born of altruism by those companies, but rather is based on 
ad sales. Few, however, will realize that rather than a passive ad sales rela-
tionship (like that developed in the free television era), the true value of the 
relationship is not only as a pair of eyes to view an advertisement, but as an 
aggregate of individual data that can be sold to advertisers to create increas-
195. McGowan, supra note 104, at 401 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 
761). 
196. /d. 
197. See supra Section II.B. 
198. See supra Section II.B. 
199. See, e.g., Parr, supra note 149 (noting that rumors of Facebook beginning to 
charge for use circulating Internet at various intervals cause great uproar). 
200. See FACEBOOK, supra note 5 (stating, "It's free and always will be"). 
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ingly personalized and custom advertisements. 201 Indeed, because many web 
companies begin offering services before monetizing-and indeed before 
corning up with a strategy to monetize-it is not really the consumer's fault 
when she doesn't conceive of the relationship as a commercial one. 202 
Though the suggestion that the concerns animating the commercial 
speech doctrine are focused on the audience rather than the speaker is not 
necessarily misplaced, the focus on consumer expectations to identify which 
speech is commercial simply does not capture the nuances of the modem 
web economy. What the above discussion is meant to highlight is that in the 
case of advertisements for free web-based services, the consumer is being 
commodified in a way that he or she might not realize, but that makes the 
transaction no less commercial. 203 
Accepting the audience-focused approach to commercial speech may 
suggest a dismissal of these concerns either (1) by claiming that the audi-
ence members using these Internet-based services understand themselves to 
be engaged in a commercial transaction, or (2) by asserting that the real 
concern is not with consumer expectations, but with ensuring the free flow 
of information in the commercial arena. The first of these assertions, while 
perhaps true for some of the more savvy consumers who are wholly aware 
of their data being traded on, is certainly not the universal understanding of 
20 I. See supra Section II .A. 
202. How Does ?interest Make Money?, PINTEREST HELP CENTER, 
https://help.pinterest.com/entries/22997783-How-does-Pinterest-make-money- (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2013) (answering the question "How does Pinterest make money?," Pinterest states, 
"Right now, we're focused on growing Pinterest and making it more valuable. To fund these 
efforts, we've taken outside investment from entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. In the 
past, we've tested a few different approaches to making money such as affiliate links. We 
might also try adding advertisements, but we haven't done this yet"); Biz Stone, Hello 
World, TwiTTER BLOG (Apr. 13, 2010, 12:01 AM), http:/lblog.twitter.com/2010/04/hello-
world.html; see also Brian X. Chen & Jenna Wortham, A Game Explodes and Changes Life 
Overnight at a Struggling Start-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, at B3 (noting a game com-
pany was "not bringing in much revenue" on games, but with the advent of one popular 
game and the accompanying spike in number of users, it sold itself to a larger company for 
millions); Rob Walker, Peace, Love and Tumblr, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 15, 2012, at 22, 
available at http:/ /www.nytimes.com/20 12/07 /15/magazine/can-tumblrs-david-karp-
embrace-ads-without-selling-out.htrnl (describing Tumblr founder's struggle to create profit-
able ad revenue through "sponsorship" and brand creation, rather than behavioral advertis-
ing). 
203. In response to this commodification, some have suggested an "anti-free-software 
movement" that would prefer direct money-for-services transactions over the rising free 
services-for-data model. E.g., Alexis C. Madrigal, Why You Should Want to Pay for Soft-
ware, Instagram Edition, ATLANTIC (Dec. 17, 2012, 1:10 PM), 
http://m. theatlantic.com/technology/archive/20 12/12/why-you-should-want-to-pay-for-
software-instagram-edition/266367/ ("Truly, the only way to get around the privacy prob-
lems inherent in advertising-supported social networks is to pay for services that we value. 
It's amazing what power we gain in becoming paying customers instead of the product being 
sold."). 
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those using these so-called "free services.m04 Furthermore, even if this con-
sumer understanding was true, it still would not answer the argument of 
those who wish to advance a clearly outlined defmition of commercial 
speech. 205 The second of these two assertions certainly does track with the 
case law considering the matter. However, it can be seen as begging the 
question: Without a clear operative definition of commercial speech, how 
do we determine whether a particular area makes up part of the commercial 
arena in which the flow of speech can be regulated?206 
C. Toward a Modem Definition of"Commercial Transaction" 
This Article does not seek to diverge too sharply from the Bolger test 
for commercial speech, 207 but rather to propose a change in our conception 
of what it means to propose a "commercial transaction" in the modem in-
formation economy. 208 The old formulation of commercial speech as speech 
that proposes the sale of a good or service for a particular price209 needs to 
give way to realize the commercial value of consumer data. What we pro-
pose is that the definition of "commercial transaction" should include trans-
actions where a company leverages consumer participation in its service as 
a saleable good. 
There are two facets to this proposition. First, consumer participation 
in a "free" service is valuable in and of itself because larger audience num-
bers allow websites (and in the earlier formulation, network television sta-
204. Danny Goodwin, Facebook Kills Rumor, Announces 'Facebook Will Always Be 
Free,' SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (Sept. 26, 2011), 
http://searchenginewatch.com/article/21121 06/F ace book-Kills-Rumor-Announces-
Facebook-Will-Always-Be-Free ('"Free to use,' anyway. The hidden cost to users is a lack 
of privacy .... "). 
205. See Earnhardt, supra note I 05, at 803; McGowan, supra note I 04, at 400-01. 
206. Cf Riley v. Nat'! Fed'n of the Blind ofN.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1988) 
(stating that the government cannot compel speech of even professional fundraisers); 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 4 71 U.S. 626, 651-53 (1985) (holding that the 
state can compel content in attorney advertising, and the "interests at stake in this case are 
not of the same order as those discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette"). 
207. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983). 
208. In many ways the new information economy is a barter economy, with some-
thing of value, in this case data, exchanged for a good or service in lieu of using money. 
Numerous states include barter in their definitions of sales or vending, see, e.g., ALA. CODE 
§ 8-17-271(7) (2012) (including barter in the definition of "[s]ale" of cigarettes); ARrz. REv. 
STAT. ANN.§ 28-5601(29) (2012) (defining "[s]ell" to include barter); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 20-
27-2103(6)(A) (2012) (defining "[s]ale" to include barter); CAL. FooD & AGRIC. CODE§ 44 
(West 2012) (defining "[s]ell" to include barter); Mrss. CoDE ANN.§ 75-27-3(3) (2012) (de-
fining "sale" and "sell" to include barter); and N.Y. TAX LAW§ 470 (McKinney Supp. 2012) 
(defining "[s]ale" to include barter), but no federal case has applied the commercial speech 
doctrine to an offer for bartering. 
209. McGowan, supra note I 04, at 40 I. 
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tions) to sell advertisements for a premium. 210 But more importantly, the 
personal data provided by consumers through their online participation, 
whether by creation ofUGC on a social networking site or by the content of 
their searches on an Internet search engine, is of great value to these service 
providers. 
There seems to be little disagreement that consumer data is a valuable 
commodity. Numerous articles have described the great and ever-increasing 
value of the consumer data that companies like Google, Facebook, and Mi-
crosoft are able to extract from user interactions with their web-based ser-
vices. 211 In some ways, commentators have noted, most web titans are run-
ning a data mining operation, offering free services as loss leaders to drive 
up traffic. 212 Data provided by consumers is used not only by web compa-
nies to sell more targeted advertisements, which command a price premi-
um, 213 but can also be aggregated and sold to other companies. 214 
The leveraging of consumer data to sell advertisements or aggregate 
data is surely as much of a commercial enterprise as providing "(X) good or 
service at (Y) price."215 It is clear that when one of these online service pro-
viders collects user information to sell to a data aggregator or displays tar-
geted ads for an advertiser, it is engaged in a commercial transaction. This 
fact underscores the value of a user base and user data. Thus, it must be the 
case that when users take advantage of these "free" online services they 
210. Consider, for example, the premium advertisements on broadcast media during 
high traffic viewing such as the Super Bowl or the Academy Awards. This ad time is precise-
ly more valuable because of the increased number of viewers, just as a large number of users 
bestows value on these Internet based services. It would seem apparent that even though 
NBC did not charge viewers for access to the channel, they could still not produce mislead-
ing advertisements about themselves. 
211. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
212. Vasant Dhar, Get Paid for Your Data on Facebook, WIRED (June 11, 2012, 2:29 
PM), http://www. wired.com/business/20 12/06/opinion-get-paid-for-your-fb-data/ ("As its 
user base grows, Facebook's data becomes its primary asset. ... Large troves of data are 
valuable because they make it easy to build predictive models which in tum translate into 
money."). 
213. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval ofClass Action Settlement 
at 16-17, Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. CV 11-01726) 
(valuing injunctive relief that limited Facebook's use of Sponsored Stories at $103 million); 
Claire Hoffman, The Battle for Facebook, ROLLING STONE, June 26, 2008, at 64, 70-71 
(quoting Mark Zuckerberg as saying, '"Nothing influences people more than a recommenda-
tion from a trusted friend .... A trusted referral is the Holy Grail of advertising"'). 
214. While the Supreme Court recently considered a case involving data mining and 
commercial speech, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (20 11), the case does not 
answer the questions examined here. Rather, in IMS Health, the focus was on the regulation 
of the transfer of data. /d. at 2659. The concern here is not with the Internet companies' use 
or transfer of user data, but rather the communications involved in the formative relationship 
between user and service provider. 
215. McGowan, supra note 104, at 401 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976)). 
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have exchanged something of clear value, and a commercial transaction has 
taken place. Advertisements designed to persuade consumers to use such 
services-and thus provide the company with valuable data-should also be 
squarely within the definition of commercial speech. 
Indeed, if the exchange of consumer data (whether UGC, search data, 
or GPS location) for access to a free service were not considered an ex-
change of valued goods, many of the terms of service provided by the ser-
vice providers would not be enforceable. Courts across the country have 
upheld so-called "clickwrap" agreements that users must accept to proceed 
and use the site's services216 without controversy, even in the case of sites 
offering free web services. 217 Similar to clickwrap agreements are 
"browsewrap" agreements. 218 Although there is some controversy over 
whether the distinction between clickwrap and browsewrap agreements is a 
useful or meaningful one, 219 courts have increasingly been willing to uphold 
even browsewrap agreements as enforceable contracts. 220 Whether the terms 
216. "[C]lickwrap" is generally understood to describe agreements where users are 
presented with a website's terms of service and must affirmatively agree with those terms, 
usually by clicking an "I agree" box or button. Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. 
REv. 459, 459 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Clickwrap is thus akin to a digital 
version of a standard form contract-a long, nonnegotiable document drafted by the party 
offering the service and signed by the consumer. See id. at 466. For a helpful summary of 
these terms and the developing case law in this area, see generally id.; Ian Rambarran & 
Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap Agreements All They Are Wrapped Up to Be?, 9 TUL. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 173 (2007). 
217. As clickwrap mimics standard form contracts of which courts are very familiar, 
numerous courts have readily upheld such agreements. Lemley, supra note 216, at 466; see, 
e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that Internet 
commerce does not alter basic contract law and that a clickwrap agreement should be en-
forced); A.V. v. iParadigrns, L.L.C., 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 480 (E.D. Va. 2008) (holding that 
under Virginia law the plaintiffs assented to a clickwrap agreement after clicking on an "I 
Agree" icon which appeared directly below a list of terms); Recursion Software, Inc. v. In-
teractive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 756, 781-83 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (upholding a 
clickwrap agreement for a software download and citing cases that form a consensus on the 
issue); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., No. C-98 JW PVT ENE, C-98-20064 JW, 
1998 WL 388389, at *3-9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (assuming such an agreement was en-
forceable without discussing the issue). 
218. "[B]rowsewrap" agreements offer users a link to the terms of service but, unlike 
clickwrap, do not require the user to take an affirmative step to agree to the terms. Lemley, 
supra note 216, at 460. Websites offering such browsewrap agreements apparently assume 
use of the site's services with knowledge (or access to knowledge) of its terms suffices as 
agreement to a contract. 
219. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Judge Can't Decide if Facebook's User Agreement Is a 
Browsewrap, but He Enforces It Anyways-Fteja v. Facebook, ERIC GOLDMAN: TECH. & 
MARKETING L. BWG (Jan. 30, 2012, 9:25 AM), 
http:/ /blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/20 12/0 I! court_ cant_ deci.htrn. 
220. Lemley, supra note 216, at 460; see, e.g., Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 403 
(holding that repeated use of the website with access to its terms constituted assent to those 
terms); PDC Labs., Inc. v. Hach Co., No. 09-1110, 2009 WL 2605270, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 
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of service agreements used by companies like Facebook are considered 
clickwrap, browsewrap, or '"modified clickwrap, "'221 courts have upheld 
Facebook's terms of service as an enforceable contract. 222 
Underlying these decisions is the understanding that, even in the case 
of sites offering free services, there is sufficient consideration being offered 
by the consumer in exchange for those services.223 This makes sense, given 
the real-world value of the data the consumer creates by using, interacting 
with, and sometimes generating content for the free site. Given the courts' 
implicit acceptance of the value of consumer data to websites offering free 
services, it seems odd to have a definition of "consumer transaction" that 
excludes such exchanges. The expansion of "commercial transaction" to 
include exchanges of free services for personal data that will be leveraged 
against for later ad sales or aggregation is therefore consistent with what 
courts enforcing web terms of service agreements already acknowledge to 
be an exchange of commercially valuable goods. 
While changing the conception of the commercial speech doctrine to 
reach these transactions of the new information economy does not signifi-
cantly diverge from the current defmition laid out in Bolger and elsewhere, 
it is a critical expansion necessary to reach some of the largest commercial 
actors in the digital economy. A test that expands the definition of commer-
cial speech to reach speech that is not proposing a direct fee-for-services 
transaction actually follows the path of Bolger quite well. Notably, it was in 
Bolger that the Court determined speech that did more than propose a direct 
25, 2009) (holding that a browsewrap agreement was sufficiently conspicuous to users of a 
website where a hyperlink to the agreement was included on multiple pages of the website in 
underlined, blue, contrasting text); Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Servs., Inc., No. C 04-04825 
JW, 2005 WL 756610, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005) (holding that a visit to a website with 
knowledge of an arbitration agreement in its terms indicated acceptance of the arbitration); 
Ticketrnaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL 21406289, at 
*2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) (holding that a website's terms preventing commercial use of 
information were binding on a company that did not ever expressly assent); Pollstar v. 
Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981-82 (E.D. Cal. 2000)(refusing to find a browsewrap 
agreement unenforceable at the summary judgment phase). 
221. Facebook's Terms of Service agreement requires affirmative assent by users, as 
does clickwrap, however, the terms of service are not in front of the user at the time of 
agreement, thus mimicking browsewrap. See supra note 24. Because it fits neither of these 
models in full, one court has called such agreements '"modified clickwrap, "' acknowledging 
that users have in fact clicked in assent. Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 
904,910-11 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
222. See, e.g., Cohen v. Facebook, Inc. (Cohen 1), 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1096 (N.D. 
Cal. 2011); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc. (Cohen II), No. C 10-5282 RS, 2011 WL 5117164, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011); Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 805-06 (N.D. Cal. 
2011); E.K.D. ex rei. Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., No. 11-461-GPM, 2012 WL 324392, at *8 
(S.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2012). 
223. See R.ESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 71 (1981). 
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economic transaction could still be regulated as commercial speech. 224 
Though not making any given factor determinative, there, the Court looked 
to deeper motivation behind the speech. 225 Our test makes a similar move. 
Access to these "free" services is not provided by the benevolence of the 
Internet companies; rather access is granted in exchange for commercially 
valuable assets-a user base and user data. The motivation behind the 
speech of these digital companies is, in fact, classically economic. They are 
receiving a valuable good in exchange for their "free" services. 
Furthermore, expanding the definition of commercial transactions, and 
thus commercial speech, to include these data-for-services leveraging rela-
tionships is also thoroughly consistent with the values underlying the com-
mercial speech doctrine. Perhaps even more so than in the context of classic 
fee-for-good or fee-for-service advertising, users in the "free" digital con-
text have a deep interest in an open flow of information, one of the key mo-
tivations behind the grant of protection for commercial speech. 226 Individu-
als clearly understand that when they exchange money for a good or service 
they are engaged in an economic transaction with the speaker. Further, they 
are more likely, being wholly aware of the financial motivation of the 
speaker, to be wary when considering apparent advertising. In the new eco-
nomic models discussed above, this commercial relationship is often less 
apparent to the users, and thus they may be less likely to turn a critical eye 
to the speech in question. 227 Furthermore, in a transaction where the con-
sumers may be less aware of what they are giving up, it is all the more criti-
cal that the flow of information be robust. Our test calls not just for a con-
sistent application of the commercial speech doctrine, but for taking ex-
tremely seriously the values underlying the doctrine. The free flow of in-
formation is critical to consumer choice, 228 and the commercial speech doc-
trine should be applied in a way that takes consumer access to information 
very seriously. 
Some may worry that this expansion of the definition of commercial 
speech could lead to a slippery slope, reaching forms of speech that should 
be entitled to full First Amendment protection. This argument insists that 
there be a fee-for-goods or a fee-for-services transaction proffered in order 
for speech to be considered commercial. This concern is unfounded for two 
224. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983). 
225. !d. at 67 (noting that courts consider the motivation underlying speech as one of 
three factors to determine whether the speech would be subject to commercial speech analy-
sis). 
226. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (stating 
that "the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified princi-
pally by the value to consumers ofthe information such speech provides"). 
227. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text. 
228. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 763-64 (1976). 
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reasons. Just as with all applications of the commercial speech doctrine, our 
test only reaches the formative relationship. 229 It does not purport to "'pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith there-
in. "'230 Where individuals are going to be leveraged by a company in order 
to raise capital, those individuals are clearly trading something of value, 
even if it just be themselves as a user, 231 and a commercial transaction has in 
fact occurred. Recognition of this fact does not prevent these companies 
from advocating at will in politics, religion, or any other matters of opinion. 
Second, this concern arises out of a confusion of the speaker and the partic-
ular speech act. The fact that it is a corporate speaker is not what answers 
the commercial speech question; otherwise, there would not be the separate 
corporate speech doctrine. Rather, in determining what constitutes commer-
cial speech, we must look to that particular speech act itself and whether it 
is one concerned with the formation of a commercial relationship, including 
such a relationship where the exchange is not simply one of a fee-for-goods 
or fee-for-services, but where the individual gives up his or herself132 m 
order to access "free" goods or services. 
CONCLUSION 
This call for an expansion of the definition of commercial speech 
comes at a time when protections for corporate speech are on the rise. 233 
Without wading into the particular arguments over corporate speech versus 
commercial speech, 234 this Article stresses the importance of a continued, 
consistent application of the commercial speech doctrine in the face of an 
229. Our explicit focus on the formative relationship is perhaps also the first step in 
thinking about the question of whether our expansion of the definition of commercial speech 
creates a danger of government prohibition of false representations made by users of these 
"free" services. Notably, in the standard fee-for-service context, it is only the offer of the 
commercial transaction-the speech of the seller-that is subject to commercial speech 
regulation. This fact should not change simply because the definition of commercial transac-
tion has been expanded to meet the realities of the digital economy. 
230. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (quoting W.Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). 
231. Consider the utility to a company to be able to claim to advertisers or funders: 
"We have XX users." 
232. By this we mean either giving up their personal data or allowing themselves to 
be deployed in the manner suggested in supra note 231, where the very fact of one's use of 
the so-called "free" services is of value to be leveraged against. 
233. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011); Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310,372 (2010); VOLOKH & FALK, supra note 1, 
at 6. 
234. Piety, supra note 105, at 2584 (noting that the "trend is to offer broader protec-
tion to commercial speech and corporate speakers than has been extended in the past"); see 
also id. at 2592-604 (comparing the corporate and commercial speech doctrines). 
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ascendant economic model. Every legal doctrine arises in a particularized 
historical period, but as the Court has consistently noted, cognizance of this 
historical reality does not cabin the application of the doctrine solely to the 
problems of that time period. 235 Keeping this in mind, it seems obvious that 
the defmition of commercial speech should be expanded to reach the trans-
actional relationship that has become so common across the past decades 
that huge portions of our population undertake it multiple times a day. 236 ' 
It is of perhaps greater importance in a time of increased protection of 
commercial speakers to have a commercial speech test that maps more 
completely to the economic transactions of the day. Where corporate actors 
otherwise have a full panoply of speech rights, 237 it is critical that consumers 
be able to access the full scope of necessary information when interacting 
with these increasingly powerful actors. Simply because speech rights now 
enure in much of the speech of corporate actors, it does not follow that all 
speech should have the same height of First Amendment protection. Such a 
conclusion conflates the speaker with the particular speech act and loses 
sight of the values underlying the commercial speech doctrine. 
Once again, it is important to recognize the benefits afforded by Face-
book, Google, and other free web services. The ability to connect socially 
across states, countries, and continents; share photographs and ideas with a 
worldwide audience; and have questions about politics, science, the arts, 
sports, music, and a panoply of other areas answered instantaneously are of 
235. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) ("Some have made the 
argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the 18th century 
are protected by the Second Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional rights that 
way."); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (holding that the First Amendment pro-
vides protections for modem forms of communication); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 
35-36 (2001) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to modem methods forms of sur-
veillance ). That these cases deal with the expansion of protection of rights is of no notice in 
arguing for the expansion of the commercial speech doctrine. Notably, the commercial 
speech doctrine did not rise out of an effort to limit First Amendment protection, but it al-
lowed the extension of some protection to a type of speech that previously had no constitu-
tional status. 
236. Survey-The Frequency of Checking One's Facebook Account, STATISTA, 
http:/ /www.statista.com/statistics/ 15 5166/frequency-of-checking-of-face book -accounts-by-
us-users/ (last visited Apr. 8, 201 3) (noting that over half of Facebook users in the United 
States check their account at least once a day; over 60% of users under twenty-five years old 
check their account at least once a day); Andrew Eisner, How Addicting Is Social Media?, 
RETREVO BLOG (Oct. 9, 2009, I :26 PM), http://www.retrevo.com/contentlblog/2009/IO/how-
addicting-social-media%3F (presenting survey findings that 83% of Facebook users under 
the age of thirty-five check Facebook once a day, with 27% checking over ten times per 
day); KRISTEN PURCELL, PEW INTERNET, SEARCH AND EMAIL STILL TOP THE LIST OF MOST 
POPULAR ONLINE ACTIVITIES (2011), available at http://pewintemet.org/-/media// 
Files/Reports/2011/PIP _Search-and-Email. pdf (finding over half of American adults use 
email and search engines daily). 
237. See generally Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. 
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great value. Such services have even proven useful, indeed critical, for real 
world political and social change. 238 That these services are offered for no 
monetary charge has the potential to act as a great equalizer in the ability of 
people of different socioeconomic groups to access information, art, and 
friendship on a global basis. This Article does not argue that such services 
can or should be put out of business, or even delve into the question of 
whether they should limit their use of consumer data. But consumers de-
serve to know what they are getting into when they agree to trade their per-
sonal data for access to search engines, social networks, and other web ap-
plications yet to be created. At the very least, the commercial speech doc-
trine should stretch to allow consumers to decide whether, and under what 
terms, they are willing to become commodities. 
238. Racha Mourtada & Fadi Salem, Civil Movements: The Impact of Twitter and 
Facebook, ARAB Soc. MEDIA REP., May 20II, at I, I, available at 
http://www.dsg.ae/en/ASMR2/Images/report.pdf. 
